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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The towering peaks of the Himalayan Mountains have challenged man’s ability to 
survive in extreme conditions for centuries.  Waging war at high altitude has proven to be 
a more daunting task.  The high altitude environment has posed the same unique 
challenges to soldiers throughout history, from Alexander the Great’s Himalayan 
expedition in the fourth century B.C. to the Indo-Pakistan Kargil Conflict in 1999.1  Thin 
air is the only condition exclusive to high altitude; in the Himalayas, it combines with 
freezing temperatures and mountainous terrain to create an inhospitable environment.  
How does this environment affect soldiers, their weapons, and military operations?  How 
did the high altitude battlefield affect combat during the Kargil Conflict?  This thesis 
answers these questions and explores implications relevant to future high altitude combat. 
In the summer of 1999, Pakistan and India engaged in high altitude combat in 
Kargil, a region in the disputed state of Kashmir.  Pakistani forces occupied peaks in 
Indian-held territory, dominating the lone road that connected India to the remote reaches 
of the Kashmir state.  The Indian Army faced the formidable task of defeating an enemy 
entrenched atop commanding heights.  A campaign that lasted seventy-four days and cost 
each side more than a thousand casualties concluded with India in control of the peaks 
around Kargil.  The high altitude environment determined the nature of the conflict and 
shaped the conduct of the campaign.   
The combination of thin air, cold weather and rugged mountains has dramatic 
effects on men and their equipment.  Reduced oxygen leads to a variety of physiological 
changes and illnesses, some of which can prove fatal.  Low air pressure alters the 
accuracy and range of both weaponry and aircraft.  Cold weather incapacitates soldiers 
and degrades equipment.  Mountainous terrain makes all aspects of warfare more 
                                                 
1 High altitude is generally defined as those areas 8,000 to 14,000 feet (2,440-4,270 m) above sea level 
where a reduction in human performance is common.  Very high altitude, from 14,000 to 18,000 feet 
(4,270-5,490 m), causes severe effects on performance.  Humans can function for only short periods of 
time at extreme altitude, beyond 18,000 feet (5,490 m).  Technical Note 9402, Medical Problems in High 
Mountain Environments (Natick, Mass.: U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, 
February 1994), 5. 
2 
difficult.  Steep gradients make movement slow and hazardous.  High peaks and 
ridgelines expose men to the elements as well as plunging and often unseen enemy fire.  
These characteristics create an unforgiving battlefield, in which the environment can 
prove as deadly as the enemy.   
The Himalayan topography and atmosphere set the parameters of the military 
operations of both armies at Kargil.  Prolonged exposure to the elements degraded 
soldiers’ ability to fight, especially those who were ill equipped and inadequately trained.  
Mountaineering expertise and well-conditioned soldiers proved essential for success.  
Possession of the high ground provided an early advantage, yet did not ensure victory.  
After initial setbacks, Indian firepower and maneuver, the integration of massed artillery 
and overwhelming force, overcame Pakistani forces atop commanding heights.  Indian air 
power, although psychologically devastating and effective against fixed targets, did not 
provide reliable and consistent close support.  In the end, fierce close combat between 
infantry units decided the outcome of the battle.       
The Kargil Conflict illustrates the timeless challenges posed by combat at high 
altitude.  Tactics proven in earlier mountain wars succeeded at Kargil.  Successful Indian 
offensive tactics mirror those used by both the Gebirgsjaeger of the German Army in the 
Rhodope Mountains of Greece and the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division in the 
Apennines of Italy during the Second World War.  Fire and maneuver, provided by 
artillery and small well-trained infantry units, decided the battle.  Tactics that failed in 
previous wars did not succeed at Kargil.  Pakistani forces exposed atop the ridgelines at 
Kargil succumbed to massive firepower and bold maneuver, as fortified Greek positions 
had fallen to overwhelming German fire. 
This thesis assesses the high altitude environment’s impact on military operations 
using scientific and medical data.  Several historical examples illustrate the timeless 
attributes of military victory on the high altitude, as well as mountain, battlefield.  I 
analyze the Kargil Conflict using Indian after action reviews and battlefield accounts.  I 
also measure the Kargil experience against U.S. military doctrine, and draw comparisons 
to U.S. military operations in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002.   
3 
The implications for future high altitude combat are clear.  Well-trained and 
equipped light infantry is the only force capable of decisive maneuver in rugged 
mountain terrain.  Artillery, rather than air power, remains the preferred source of 
firepower to support ground maneuver.  Close air support cannot be relied upon as the 
sole source of fire to support maneuver on the high altitude battlefield.  Critical mistakes 
in adapting to high altitude and mountain terrain will continue to prove costly.  
Inadequate artillery support plagued U.S. Army operations in the mountains of 
Afghanistan in 2002, just as it hindered initial Indian offensives at Kargil.  Advances in 
military technology have not made these lessons obsolete. 
 
B. THE HIMALAYAN BATTLEFIELD 
Kashmir occupies the distant north of the country of India.  Pakistan and India 
have contested for control of the majority Muslim region in two wars, the first in 1947 
and a second in 1965.  The 1972 Simla Agreement following the third Indo-Pakistan war 
over Bangladesh created the Line of Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir into Pakistani 
and Indian-held portions.  India controls the eastern half of the state, which consists of 
Jammu, the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh; Pakistan controls the west, which it calls 
“Azad” (Free) Kashmir, and the Northern Areas (see Figure 1).2 
                                                 
2 “Azad” (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas are autonomous regions administered by the 
government of Pakistan.  India refers to “Azad” Kashmir as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Ashok 




Figure 1.   Kashmir and the Northern Areas. (From: 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html> (February 2003)) 
 
Ladakh is the northern section of the state, and shares borders with China and 
Pakistan.  It is divided into two districts, Kargil and Leh.  The main land approach to 
Ladakh is the 434-kilometer (km) Srinagar-Leh Highway, which is also known as 
National Highway 1A.  The highway connects Srinagar, the state’s summer capital in the 
heart of the Kashmir Valley, to the remote town of Leh, the largest town in Ladakh (see 
Figure 2).  The Srinagar-Leh Highway is Ladakh’s only link to the Kashmir Valley, 
making the region susceptible to isolation.  It is most vulnerable near the town of Kargil.  
The road passes close to the LOC in the Kargil district, and winds through the critical 
Zoji-La Pass, the gateway to Ladakh and a chokepoint at an altitude of 11,600 feet (3,535 
m) near the town of Dras. 
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Figure 2.   The Srinagar-Leh Highway. (After: Rahul Bedi, “India Strikes Back at 
Intruders,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (9 June 1999), 66) 
 
Mountain ranges divide Ladakh and dominate its landscape.  The Great 
Himalayan Range separates Ladakh from the Kashmir Valley.  Three other major ranges, 
the Zanskar, Ladakh and the Karakoram, also pass through the region.  The peaks in the 
Kargil district rise to altitudes between 16,000 feet (4,880 m) and 18,000 feet (5,485 m) 
above sea level.  The treeless ridgelines are vast and barren, made up of loose rocks.   
Ladakh lies in the shadow of the Great Himalayan Range that shields the region 
from the monsoon rains that flood most Indian states to the south.  It is an arid land that 
receives as little as two inches of rainfall a year.  The scarcity of water creates a desolate 
landscape with sparse vegetation.  High peaks, whose snow melts quickly in the early 
summer months, are the only source of water. 
High altitude produces extremely low temperatures across the region.  As a 
general rule, the temperature drops one degree centigrade for each 100-meter increase in 
elevation.3  The town of Dras is typically referred to as the second coldest inhabited place 
                                                 
3 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 26. 
6 
in the world, with winter temperatures dropping to -60° C.4  Temperatures in Kargil reach 
-30° C in the winter, and rise above freezing during the summer months.  Wind speeds on 
the peaks and ridgelines are high and create low wind chill.  The stark landscape, 
combined with arctic temperatures, has caused travelers to refer to the region as a “cold 
desert.”5  
High elevation creates a unique atmosphere in the mountains around Kargil.  
Ultraviolet light increases rapidly with rise in elevation.  The radiation level is 55 percent 
higher than at sea level, and can cause severe sunburn and snow blindness.6  The 
barometric pressure is half that at sea level.  The partial pressure of oxygen falls as well, 
producing arid air that holds little water vapor.7  The high altitude atmosphere makes 
Ladakh an inhospitable and sparsely populated land, yet one that Pakistan has sought to 
control since its founding in 1947. 
 
C. THE 1999 KARGIL CONFLICT 
Only a small circle of senior Pakistani leaders know whether the incursion that 
began in early 1999 was a strategy designed to force international intervention in 
Kashmir, or if it was simply the result of local commanders’ initiative to seize terrain 
along the LOC unoccupied by Indian forces.8  Although the strategic objective may not 
have been grand in scope, the operation offered Pakistan an opportunity to alter the 
situation on the ground in Kashmir.  Occupation of several critical peaks would threaten 
the Srinagar-Leh Highway and isolate Leh, India's base of operations in Ladakh.  
                                                 
4 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Mountain Warfare: The Kargil Experience,” Asian Defence Journal, Vol. 10 
(October 1999), 46. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The radiation level at 14,000 feet (4,270 m) is 55 percent higher than at sea level.  Medical Problems 
in High Mountain Environments, 27. 
7 Ibid 4. 
8 Some observers believe that the operation had the sanction of the highest levels of Pakistan military 
authority, and that General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, and Lieutenant General Mohammed 
Aziz, Chief of General Staff, developed the operation and supervised its execution.  Others counter that the 
operation was a local initiative, coordinated at division level and lower, designed to occupy terrain that 
created a tactical advantage within the sector.  Most sources on both the reason for the incursion and events 
that took place during the conflict are of Indian origin, with the exception of an interview between Feroz 
Khan, Brigadier, Pakistan Army (Retired) and the author, 28 February 2003.  Brigadier Khan commanded 5 
NLI in the early 1990’s, serving along the LOC in Turtok and the Neelum Valley opposite Kargil. 
7 
Pakistani planners gambled that possession of the formidable heights would dissuade 
India from launching an offensive to retake the lost ground. 
 
1. Background 
A light force initiated covert infiltration across the LOC into the peaks around 
Kargil in the spring of 1999.  The Northern Light Infantry (NLI), composed of local men 
accustomed to working in the mountains, provided the majority of the 1,700-man force.  
Highly trained Special Services Group (SSG) soldiers reportedly accompanied the small 
infantry units.  At least eighteen artillery batteries reportedly supported the operation, 
most from across the LOC in Pakistani territory.9 
Pakistani soldiers infiltrated by both foot and helicopter.  They built fortified 
positions and occupied abandoned Indian outposts.  They brought substantial firepower, 
including light cannon, mortars, and surface-to-air missiles (SAM).  The NLI occupied 
outposts along a total frontage of about 150-km, at heights approaching 18,000 feet 
(5,485 m) above sea level.  Their positions included the strategic Tololing-Tiger Hill 
complex in Dras that dominates the Srinagar-Leh Highway near the Zoji-La Pass. 
The operation caught the Indian military by surprise.  The Indian Army normally 
stretched the battalions of 121 Infantry Brigade along the 168-km LOC in the Kargil 
sector for routine security operations.10  The battalions occupied outposts on several key 
avenues of approach.  Soldiers conducted regular patrols and manned isolated posts, but 
left approximately 80-km of unmanned gaps.  Patrols and outposts failed to detect the 
NLI soldiers throughout the spring.  A group of shepherds discovered the intruders in 
early May, and the full extent of the Pakistani incursion became evident within a matter 
of days.11 
After weeks of uncertainty and deliberation, the Indian government issued orders 
to its armed forces at the end of May.  The Indian government ordered the armed forces 
to evict the Pakistani forces and restore the original LOC.  The Indian Army developed 
                                                 
9 The Kargil Review Committee Report (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 95. 
10 121 Infantry Brigade contained five battalions in the summer of 1999.  Ibid 85. 
11 Rahul Bedi, “Paying to Keep the High Ground,” Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No.10 
(October 1999), 29. 
8 
Operation Vijay (Victory) based on three successive objectives: contain the existing 
enemy pockets to prevent further build-up of forces; evict the enemy forces; finally, 
Indian Army units would occupy key terrain along the LOC.12 
 
2.  The Northern Light Infantry 
The NLI excelled at several aspects of high mountain warfare and gained an early 
advantage.   Soldiers traveled in small groups, employing skilled mountaineers and mule 
teams.  Pakistan Army helicopters ferried troops and equipment, and were rarely spotted 
by Indian patrols.  Soldiers and mules carried disassembled light artillery pieces across 
the LOC.  Pakistani guns harassed Indian troop movements along the Srinagar-Leh 
Highway and successfully shattered initial Indian assaults.  Dispersed and concealed 
SAMs destroyed an Indian helicopter and two ground attack aircraft early in the 
campaign. 
Prolonged exposure to the high altitude environment gradually eroded the NLI’s 
ability to fight and survive.  Soldiers remained in positions for long periods of time, 
exposed to thin air and cold weather.  Tactical mistakes in mountain terrain negated 
initial success.  Holding the high ground did not ensure victory.  Linear defenses 
consisting of undermanned positions sat exposed to massive Indian artillery barrages.  
The NLI lacked adequate materials to construct positions in the austere environment.  
Overhead cover typically collapsed under artillery fire, killing the inhabitants.  Tactical 
mistakes combined with failure to adapt to the environment shifted the advantage to the 
Indian forces. 
 
3. The Indian Response 
The Indian military rushed forces to the region once it finally realized the scope of 
Pakistan’s incursion.  By the end of May 1999, the Indian Army had amassed a force of 
nineteen infantry battalions and several artillery regiments in the Kargil sector (see 
                                                 
12 Vinod Anand, “India's Military Response to the Kargil Aggression,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23.7 
(October 1999) at <http://www.ciaonet.org/olf/sa/sa_99anv05.html> (April 2002). 
9 
Appendix.  Array of Forces During the Kargil Conflict).13  Initial offensive operations 
failed despite an overwhelming force advantage.  Indian planners underestimated the size 
and tenacity of their foe, and poorly planned assaults produced staggering casualties.  
Soldiers involved in the initial actions were neither equipped nor prepared for high 
altitude combat.  Battalions launched uphill assaults without sufficient artillery and close 
air support.  Indian infantrymen advanced up steep gradients.  Assaults faded as men 
succumbed to exhaustion and enemy fire.    
The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) efforts, Operation Safed Sagar (White Sea), 
produced mixed results.  Thin air diminished weapon accuracy and hindered aircraft 
performance.  Adverse weather and the heightened SAM threat hampered the IAF’s 
attempts at close air support (CAS).  Aircraft proved unreliable in rapidly changing 
weather, and a lack of pilot training for CAS in the mountains further diminished the 
IAF’s ability to provide firepower in coordination with ground maneuver.  The IAF 
eventually adapted and enjoyed some success, primarily against fixed targets.  The 
introduction of laser-guided munitions (LGM) increased accuracy and contributed to the 
fight on Tiger Hill.  IAF pressure on NLI soldiers had a significant psychological effect.  
Unconventional techniques, such as using aerial munitions to create avalanches over 
trails, isolated Pakistani defensive positions and destroyed supply sites. 
The Indian Army modified its offensive tactics and exploited NLI errors.  
Massive artillery barrages preceded infantry assaults.  Suppressive fire, provided 
primarily by artillery and mortars, set the conditions for successful attacks.  Battalions 
advanced along the most inaccessible routes.  Daring maneuver along a difficult axis of 
attack created the crucial element of surprise.  Indian soldiers climbed vertical cliffs 
throughout the night, attacking the Pakistani positions at dawn.  Once at the objective, 
victory depended on combat at close quarters. 
The Indian armed forces prevailed, driving the NLI from all of its positions by the 
end of July.  India lost 474 soldiers killed in action and 1,109 wounded; Indian analysts 
estimated that Pakistan suffered approximately 700 casualties.14  Pakistan claimed 
                                                 
13 Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999 (Delhi: Tulika, 2001), 62. 
14 Ashok Kalyan Verma, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), Kargil: Blood on the Snow, 126. 
10 
throughout the operation that mujahadeen militants beyond the government’s control 
planned and executed the incursion.15  Captured documents, prisoners of war, and the 
bodies of Pakistan Army officers killed in action seemed to prove otherwise.  Faced with 
mounting evidence, in late July Pakistan officially acknowledged that soldiers had been 
“martyred in the adventure.”16 
 
D.  ORGANIZATION 
This thesis has five chapters.  Chapter I introduces the case study and provides a 
brief background of the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the geography of the region.  Chapter II 
describes the characteristics of the high altitude environment.  It assesses the impact of 
thin air, cold weather and mountainous terrain on soldiers and weaponry.  Historical 
examples illustrate the effects of the high altitude environment on the conduct of military 
operations, as well as the tactics that either failed or succeeded in previous high mountain 
wars.   
Chapter III provides an analysis of the NLI operations during the Kargil Conflict.  
The NLI’s early tactical victories are studied, as well as the subsequent errors and 
detrimental effects of high altitude that erased initial success.  Chapter IV offers an 
analysis of the Indian Army’s rapid deployment to Kargil and the offensive operations 
that followed.  The chapter evaluates the role that the environment played in the Indian 
military’s initial setbacks, as well as the adaptation of both ground and air operations that 
led to victory.  Chapter V concludes with a study of U.S. combat operations in 
Afghanistan in 2002, and identifies several similarities with Indian operations at Kargil.  
The thesis concludes with a summary of the lessons of high altitude ground combat 
demonstrated by both the Kargil Conflict and U.S. operations in Afghanistan, as well as 
the implications for future high mountain warfare. 
 
                                                  
15 Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “Appendix 12, Pakistan Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif’s Address to the Nation, 12 July 1999,” Kargil: The Tables Turned, Ed. Major General 
Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 325. 
16 Quote taken from Pakistan Information Minister Mushahid Hussain. Prasun K. Sengupta, 
“Mountain Warfare and Tri Service Operations,” Asian Defence Journal, Vol. 11 (November 1999), 28. 
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II. THE HIGH ALTITUDE BATTLEFIELD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Thin air, cold weather and rugged mountains pose a significant challenge to 
man’s ability to survive at high altitude.  These characteristics create a unique and 
unforgiving battlefield, in which the environment can prove as deadly as the enemy.  This 
chapter describes the high altitude environment’s effect on soldiers, weapons, and 
military operations.  In addition, it offers several examples from previous wars that 
provide lessons regarding the strategy and tactics best suited for high altitude combat.     
The high altitude environment significantly affects soldiers and the tools of war.  
Reduced oxygen causes a wide range of physiological effects and illnesses.  The 
atmosphere inflicts casualties and degrades soldiers’ ability to carry out and sustain 
military operations.  The process of acclimatization allows men to adapt to the 
environment and retain the capacity to perform.  In addition to its effect on men, low air 
pressure alters the accuracy and performance of both weapons and aircraft.  Cold weather 
incapacitates men and equipment.   Mountainous terrain makes all aspects of warfare 
more difficult, and places limits on ground maneuver.   
Like warfare on any field, high altitude combat is decided by the application of 
firepower and maneuver.  Wars fought atop the earth’s highest plateaus and among its 
many mountain chains illustrate the most effective methods of fire and maneuver.  
Combat ranging from the German and U.S. Army in the mountains of Europe during the 
Second World War to the Soviet Army in Afghanistan suggests that well-trained light 
infantry units best execute maneuver.  An unexpected and difficult approach by small 
elements produces tactical surprise, which is essential against a foe atop high ground.  
Artillery is the preferred source of firepower primarily because of its reliability and 
ability to mass overwhelming fire.  Failure to adapt to the environment and recognize the 





B. THIN AIR – THE UNIQUE CONDITION OF HIGH ALTITUDE 
The phenomenon of thin air, caused by low barometric pressure, is the only 
environmental condition unique to high terrestrial altitude.  It imposes several physical 
stresses on men.  The barometric pressure at 16,000 feet (4,880 m) is half its value at sea 
level.17  The partial pressure of oxygen falls as well, producing arid air that holds 
significantly less water vapor and reducing the amount of oxygen available to human 
tissue.18  Hypoxia, the reduction of oxygen supply to tissue, occurs at elevations above 
5,000 feet (1,524 m).19  Hypoxia can lead to several illnesses, some of which can prove 
fatal, as well as less severe physiological effects.  The most common altitude illness is 
acute mountain sickness (AMS). 
 
1. Altitude Illness 
Rapid ascent to elevations beyond 8,000 feet (2,446 m) above sea level generally 
causes AMS.20  Headache and nausea are the most common symptoms.  Most men 
afflicted with AMS suffer muscular weakness, fatigue and appetite loss as well.  
Symptoms appear within twenty-four hours, and usually dissipate within four to seven 
days.21  A high carbohydrate diet reduces AMS symptoms, and medication can also be 
helpful in tempering its symptoms.22  The only sure treatment for AMS is descent to a 
lower elevation. 
High altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE) and cerebral edema (HACE) are more 
severe syndromes that occur when soldiers rapidly ascend beyond 8,000 feet (2,438 m) 
above sea level.  HAPE, fluid accumulation in the lungs, is the most common cause of 
death among altitude illnesses.  It manifests as a dry cough and labored breathing.  
                                                 
17 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 4. 
18 At 14,765 feet (4,500 m) the partial pressure of oxygen is 40 percent less than at sea level.  A. 
Roberto Frisancho, Human Adaptation and Accommodation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1993), 221. 
19 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 5. 
20 Rapid ascent is within twenty-four hours.  Up to 20 percent of soldiers will develop AMS at 8,000 
feet (2,446 m).  All soldiers will experience AMS beyond 17,500 feet (5,333 m).  Ibid 10. 
21 Robert Karniol, “Fighting on the Roof of the World,” Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 22 (2 
December 1998), 30. 
22 Acetazolamide lessens the impact of AMS.  Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 12. 
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Cyanosis, in which the extremities turn blue in color, occurs as the illness worsens.  
HACE, swelling of the brain, is more severe and less common.  Once symptoms 
manifest, both HAPE and HACE can progress to coma and death in less than twelve 
hours.  Immediate descent is the best treatment for both illnesses; acclimatization is the 
most effective means of prevention.23   
High altitude initiates a variety of less severe illnesses and physiological effects.  
Sub-acute mountain sickness occurs in most soldiers deployed at altitudes above 12,000 
feet (3,600 m) for extended periods of time.24  Symptoms include sleep disturbance, 
fatigue and loss of appetite.  The resulting low caloric intake can cause drastic weight 
loss.  Researchers participating in Mount Everest expeditions, which subjected men to 
altitudes approaching 21,000 feet (6,400 m), found that trained men lost a pound (.45 
kilograms) per week; men who were poorly acclimated lost almost 3 pounds (1.3 
kilograms) per week.25  Soldiers must consume at least 4,500 calories and 10 or more 
quarts of water per day to prevent weight loss and dehydration.26  In addition to the loss 
of body mass, soldiers lose their ability to work at high altitudes.  Aerobic capacity 
decreases 10 percent for each 3,000 feet (914 m) gain in elevation above 5,000 feet 
(1,524 m).27  Even the most physically fit men exhibit muscular weakness and a loss of 
neuromuscular control above 14,765 feet (4,500 m).28   
Illness combines with other physiological changes to restrict soldiers’ ability to 
function at high altitudes.  The atmosphere affects vision in several ways.  Soldiers lose 
much of their natural night vision above 8,000 feet (2,400 m); retinal hemorrhaging, 
bleeding from blood vessels in the eyes, affects over half of all soldiers at 18,000 feet 
(5,486 m).29  The drastic increase in ultraviolet light can cause snow blindness and severe 
                                                 
23 The medication nifedipine can help treat and prevent HAPE as well.  Ibid 18. 
24 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-97.6, Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 28 November 2000), 1-12. 
25 A. Roberto Frisancho, Human Adaptation and Accommodation, 228. 
26 FM 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, 5-7. 
27 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 37. 
28 A. Roberto Frisancho, Human Adaptation and Accommodation, 227. 
29 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 23. 
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sunburn.30  The time it takes for wounds to heal increases because of the lack of oxygen 
in body tissues.  The effects combine to make the environment a potent adversary; 
acclimatization is one way to reduce its impact. 
 
2. Acclimatization 
Acclimatization is the physiological adaptation to low air pressure at high altitude.  
The body compensates for reduced oxygen supply by increasing the efficiency of oxygen 
delivery to tissue.  Acclimatization, once achieved, enables the soldier to attain maximum 
physical performance.  A physically fit man can typically acclimate to a high altitude 
environment in ten days.31  Soldiers maintain a high rate of performance as long as they 
remain at altitude.  A soldier’s ability to adapt to high altitude depends largely on his 
physical fitness and age; older and unfit soldiers have a difficult time tolerating the 
environment.32  Acclimatization is not possible at altitudes beyond 18,000 feet (5,490 m). 
Staged or graded ascents are the most effective methods of acclimatization.  
Rapid ascent causes a variety of incapacitating illnesses, some of which can lead to death.  
Soldiers who conduct a staged ascent climb to intermediate altitudes and remain for 
several days until ascending higher.  Graded ascent limits daily altitude gains and focuses 
on sleep altitude.  Most armies practice a combination of the two methods.  Both the 
Indian and Pakistan Army have extensive experience with acclimatization programs.  
They have faced each other on the Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battlefield, since 
1984.  The Siachen Glacier sits on the “Roof of the World,” the Great Karakoram Range.  
The nearby Saltoro Ridge holds three passes that access the glacier.  The Saltoro’s peaks 
range from 9,100 feet (2,800 m) to 17,500 feet (5,300 m) elevation.33 
                                                 
30 Ultraviolet light increases by over 50 percent at 14,000 feet (4,250 m) above sea level. Ibid 26. 
31 Up to 80 percent of the respiratory component of acclimatization occurs in a week to 10 days for 
most soldiers operating from 8,000 to 18,000 feet (2,440 to 5,490 m).  Ibid 7. 
32 A. Roberto Frisancho, Human Adaptation and Accommodation, 238. 
33 The Indian Army seized two of the passes in the spring of 1984; Pakistan seized the third soon after.  
A Pakistani attack to dislodge the Indian forces on the two passes failed.  Each nation posted a brigade on 
the glacier, and a stalemate has ensued, with the two sides engaging in routine artillery duels.  Raspal S. 
Khosa, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Imbroglio on the Roof of the World,” Contemporary South Asia, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), 195. 
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The regular rotation of soldiers to a high altitude environment forced each army to 
develop and maintain routine acclimatization programs.  Pakistan’s program begins with 
a staged ascent and ends with a graded climb.  Soldiers ascend to 10,000 feet (3,050 m), 
where they remain for one week; they climb to 13,000 feet (3,960 m) the following week.  
From that point forward, soldiers rest one night for each 1,000 feet (305 m) climb in 
elevation.34  The graded climb places limits on sleeping altitude, allowing partial 
acclimatization to occur daily.  Soldiers who develop AMS descend to base altitude and 
repeat the process; soldiers who develop HAPE or HACE are reassigned. 
The physical and psychological stresses of high altitude degrade all soldiers over 
time, even those who are acclimated.  Most soldiers stationed on the Siachen Glacier 
develop “Siachen Syndrome,” a combination of AMS and psychological fatigue, after 
even short periods of duty on the glacier.35  Soldiers who must rapidly deploy to a high 
altitude environment do not have the benefit of an acclimatization program.  Rapid 
deployment proved devastating for the Indian Army during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.  
The Indian Army suffered more casualties due to altitude illness than enemy fire.  By 
some estimates, as much as 15 percent of the force developed HAPE.36  India rapidly 
deployed soldiers to elevations approaching 18,000 feet (5,490 m) from units spread 
throughout the country at lower elevations.  China deployed acclimated soldiers from its 
garrison at 15,000 feet (4,570 m) in Tibet.37 
 
3. Effects on Weapons and Aircraft 
Low barometric pressure affects the tools of war with a severity that equals its 
impact on man.  Thin air at high altitudes alters the trajectory of all projectiles that move 
through the atmosphere.  Projectiles are more efficient in low air pressure because of the 
                                                 
34 Acclimatization schedule detail provided by Major Hassan Iqbal, 322 Brigade medical officer, in 
Robert Karniol, “Fighting on the Roof of the World,” 31. 
35 The Indian Army estimates that the “Siachen Syndrome” affects approximately 60 percent of 
soldiers assigned to duty on the glacier.  Raspal S. Khosa, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Imbroglio on the 
Roof of the World,” 197. 
36 Charles Houston, M.D., Going Higher: Oxygen, Man and Mountains (Seattle, Wash.: The 
Mountaineers, 1998), 180. 
37 For a discussion of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China’s advantage over Indian forces 
during the 1962 war see Gerald Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 140-
157. 
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reduction in drag.  The increase in efficiency causes bullets to strike higher on the target 
at high altitude than at sea level.  At an elevation of 10,000 feet (3,050 m), a round fired 
at a target at a distance of 1,000 meters will impact almost 70 inches higher than at sea 
level.38  The range of artillery shells increases as well, yet accuracy and predictability 
suffer.  High angle munitions, such as mortar rounds, are especially erratic.39  Artillery 
units stationed atop the Siachen Glacier have learned from experience that firing tables 
developed at sea level are of no use at high altitude.40  Aircraft performance is equally 
unpredictable. 
Aircraft engines produce less power at high altitudes, reducing maneuverability 
and limiting load capacity.  In addition to a reduction in engine power, helicopters lose 
rotor efficiency in low air pressure.  Hovering is difficult and risky, and most helicopters 
are unable to lift normal loads at altitudes above 13,000 feet (3,965 m).41  Most attack 
helicopters are too heavy to fly at high altitude.  The physical limitations of the high 
altitude environment prohibit most helicopter operations, yet both Pakistan and India 
have successfully used light helicopters with exceptionally high service ceilings.  Both 
the Indian and Pakistan Army used light helicopters during offensive operations on the 
Siachen Glacier in 1984, and continue to use them for routine duty on the glacier at 
altitudes approaching 24,600 feet (7,500 m).42  An Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) 
pilot compared the difference between landing at sea level and on the glacier to “the same 
as walking on ground and trying to walk on water.”43   
                                                 
38 U.S. Army Field Manual 23-10, Sniper Training (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 17 August 1994), 3-27. 
39 Ali Ghazanfar and Hassan Akhtar Ghani, “Siachen – The World's Highest Battlefield,” Military 
Technology, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1998), 17. 
40 Pravin Sawhney, “Himalayan Conflict Forges Artillery Doctrine,” Jane’s International Defense 
Review (March 1999), 57. 
41 Lester W. Grau, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and Hernan Vazquez, Lieutenant 
Colonel, Argentine Army, “Ground Combat at High Altitude,” Military Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January-
February 2002), 22. 
42 The Aerospatiale Lama is a light single-engine helicopter; Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) 
produces a version of the aircraft (Cheetah) in India.  Raspal S. Khosa, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute: 
Imbroglio on the Roof of the World,” 195. 
43 Chindu Sreedharan, “Flying in the Face of Danger,” Rediff (June 1999) at <http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article9.html> (August 2002). 
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Fixed wing aircraft suffer similar limitations.  The drag reduction caused by low 
air pressure alters the aerodynamics of high performance aircraft.  Thin air forces a 
greater turning radius and increases the height lost in a pullout following a dive.  The lost 
height forces the pilot to initiate the pullout higher, or earlier, than at sea level.  Pilots 
must increase the weapon release height to make up for the change.44  Aerial-delivered 
munitions can be wildly inaccurate if pilots are not trained to expect variations in 
performance.  Low air pressure affects aerial weapon trajectory as well, causing even 
precision-guided munitions (PGM) to perform significantly different than sea-level 
specifications predict.45 
 
C. COLD WEATHER 
Frigid weather is common to most of the world's high mountain ranges.  A climb 
in altitude generates freezing temperatures that drop one degree centigrade for each 100-
meter increase in elevation.46  Snow and freezing temperatures degrade weapons and 
ballistic performance.  Cold weather causes incapacitating injuries, and has wreaked 
havoc on armies in past winter warfare.  German soldiers endured as much as four feet of 
snow and freezing temperatures while fighting in Russia during the Second World War.  
By January 1942, the German Army suffered 100,000 frostbite cases with over 14,000 
requiring amputation; the 6th Panzer Division lost 800 men a day to frostbite during the 
month of January.47 
Cold weather affects soldiers in a variety of ways.  Freezing temperatures reduce 
human performance and cause an initial physiological shock.  The human body can adapt 
to subzero temperatures; tolerance to cold stress is influenced by age and physical fitness, 
as well as the amount of insulation provided by both subcutaneous fat and external layers 
of clothing.48  Injuries pose a significant threat to soldiers exposed to cold weather for 
                                                 
44 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Mountain Warfare and Tri Service Operations,” 26. 
45 Anil R. Pustam, “Mountain Air Support Demands Special Equipment and Training,” United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 126, No. 9 (September 2000), 71. 
46 Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 26. 
47 Allen F. Chew, Leavenworth Paper No. 5: Fighting the Russians in Winter (Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 40. 
48 A. Roberto Frisancho, Human Adaptation and Accommodation, 97. 
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long periods.  Frostbite and hypothermia are common injuries that typically require 
treatment and evacuation.  Proper equipment, such as extreme cold weather gear, is 
essential for survival.  Shelter is a necessity.  The 6th Panzer Division created craters with 
explosives and cut trees for continuous fires; shelter and heat reduced frostbite cases from 
800 to 4 a day.49 
Cold weather affects weapon performance as well.  Cyclic weapons perform 
poorly due to lubricant freezing and metal brittleness.50  A weapon fired in subzero 
temperatures crystallizes water vapor in the air, creating ice fog that hangs over the 
weapon and vapor trails that follow the round and obscures the gunner's vision.51  Frigid 
air reduces the range of projectiles and affects the burst characteristics of artillery 
projectiles.  Deep snow absorbs most of the impact burst of artillery rounds.  Mortars are 
significantly affected; a cold tube can prevent the propellant from completely burning, 
causing the round to lose range.52 
 
D. THE ETERNAL MOUNTAINS 
In addition to the atmosphere, armies that wage war at high altitude must contend 
with the rugged and imposing terrain of the mountains.  Peaks and ridgelines expose 
soldiers to severe weather and restrict movement.  Rocky terrain degrades equipment and 
men alike, and makes all aspects of warfare more difficult.  Terrain folds hide enemy 
forces from aerial and ground observation, and mask the effects of firepower.  Mountains 
increase the requirements necessary to support soldiers and makes logistics more 
difficult.  The limited availability of trafficable roads makes mountain warfare the 
domain of the light infantry. 
 
                                                 
49 Allen F. Chew, Leavenworth Paper No. 5: Fighting the Russians in Winter, 40. 
50 Ali Ghazanfar and Hassan Akhtar Ghani, “Siachen – The World’s Highest Battlefield,” 17. 
51 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-70 Basic Cold Weather Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 12 April 1968), 165. 
52 Cold mortar rounds fired in a cold tube, below -40º F, will lose as much as 20 percent of tabulated 
range due to incomplete propellant burning.  U.S. Army Field Manual 9-207 Operation and Maintenance 
of Ordnance Material in Cold Weather (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20 March 
1998), 4-14. 
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1. Terrain and the Soldier 
Mountains impede both foot and vehicular movement.  Rocky, narrow roads 
make travel a dangerous endeavor.  Foot movement is considerably limited, and 
calculated in time, not distance.  Most armies estimate one hour of time for every four 
kilometers of horizontal movement on a flat surface.  Uneven terrain generally adds at 
least one hour for every 300 meters of ascent or 600 meters of descent.53  The Pakistan 
Army estimates that a light unit requires up to six full days to travel twenty-five 
kilometers in high mountains.54  Movement is slow and treacherous, especially at night.  
A soldier’s load further reduces his mobility in the mountains.  Armies must strike a 
difficult balance between combat readiness and mobility.  Heavy loads and inadequate 
equipment tied Soviet infantrymen to their armored personnel carriers, reducing their 
effectiveness as dismounted infantry and making them vulnerable to mujahadeen 
ambushes in Afghanistan.55   
The experience of the Gebirgsjaeger, the German Army’s renowned mountain 
fighters, in both Greece and Italy during the Second World War illustrates the difficulty 
of maneuver in the mountains.  The Jaeger carried a light assault kit during the attack, 
which allowed them to scale vertical terrain quickly and gain momentum.  The assault kit 
contained a ground sheet and blanket, two days’ rations, and ammunition.  They did not 
wear helmets or carry bayonets during the attack, considering the items to be unnecessary 
weight.  During regular foot movement, however, the Jaeger carried a tremendous load.  
The average rucksack weighed 120 pounds (22 kilograms), and each man’s complete 
load with ammunition and weapon typically exceeded 165 pounds (75 kilograms).56  
Even with such a heavy burden on the backs of its soldiers, the Jaeger relied heavily on 
the most reliable means of transportation in mountains, the mule.   
                                                 
53 William M. Menning, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, “Moving in the Mountains,” Infantry, Vol. 
82, No. 1 (January-February 1992), 36. 
54 Ali Ghazanfar and Hassan Akhtar Ghani, “Siachen – The World’s Highest Battlefield,” 16. 
55 Mohammad Yahya Nawroz, General, Army of Afghanistan (Retired), and Lester W. Grau, 
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of 
Future War?” from Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1995) at 
<http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/waraf.htm> (January 2003).  
56 Barry Gregory, Mountain and Arctic Warfare: From Alexander to Afghanistan (London: Stephens, 
1989), 172. 
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Mules and porters are the primary means of logistics above 13,000 feet (3,960 m).  
They can travel on trails and mountain roads where vehicles cannot pass.  At high 
altitude, American mules can carry 20 percent of their body weight (200 pounds) up to 20 
miles a day.  For their benefit as load bearers, mules require substantial amounts of food 
and water.57  The Jaeger used mules extensively, with each division supported by over 
3,500 mules.58  Human porters provide dependable carrying capacity at high altitude, but 
rely on excess manpower, which is not always available.  The Jaeger typically employed 
up to half of each battalion in action as porters, primarily transporting ammunition and 
explosive charges.59 
 
2. Effects on Weapons and Aircraft 
Mountains alter the effects of weapon systems and impose limitations on their 
use.  Splintering and ricochet enhances the effectiveness of small arms fire and high 
explosive shells alike.60  Target engagement changes because of the difficulty of 
estimating range in mountains.  Targets seem farther away to soldiers firing downhill, 
which typically causes them to fire high.  Similarly, targets appear closer to soldiers 
firing uphill, which may cause them to fire low.  Machine guns can rarely achieve 
grazing fire due to drastic changes in elevation, and their effects are usually confined to 
the beaten zone, the area of impact created by plunging fire.  Hand grenades can be 
effective, but are dangerous due to rollback. 
Artillery suffers significant limitations in a mountainous environment.  Movement 
of guns is restricted because of high gradients and hazardous mountain roads.  Suitable 
positions are usually very small, accommodating only one gun.61  High angle fire is 
                                                 
57 American mules require ten pounds of grain, fourteen pounds of hay, thirty liters of water and an 
ounce of salt daily.  Lester W. Grau, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and Hernan Vazquez, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Argentine Army, “Ground Combat at High Altitude,” 30. 
58 Barry Gregory, Mountain and Arctic Warfare: From Alexander to Afghanistan, 173. 
59 James Lucas, Hitler’s Mountain Troops (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 51. 
60 High explosive (HE) shells with impact fuse and dual-purpose improved conventional munitions 
(DPICM) are effective on rocky ground.  FM 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, 3-5. 
61 Lester W. Grau, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and Hernan Vazquez, Lieutenant 
Colonel, Argentine Army, “Ground Combat at High Altitude,” 28. 
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necessary to clear high mountain crests.  Displacing guns in high mountains typically 
requires mule transport, making repositioning a slow and tedious process.62 
Mountains also affect air operations, imposing limits on both helicopter and fixed 
wing flight.  Low ceilings, fog and changing winds make mountain flying a dangerous 
task.  Terrain canalizes air avenues of approach, limiting ingress and egress routes and 
increasing aircraft vulnerability.  Terrain suitable for helicopter landing zones is difficult 
to find.  Target acquisition and engagement is more difficult in uneven terrain, where 
enemy positions are easily hidden.  Aircraft are more vulnerable to enemy ground fire, 
especially SAMs, which can be concealed in terrain folds.  The Soviet military lost more 
than one hundred ground-attack aircraft and three hundred helicopters to well-hidden 
mujahadeen missile and anti-aircraft gun teams during ten years of combat in the 
mountains of Afghanistan.63 
 
E. THE OPERATIONAL ART OF HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE 
Reduced mobility in restrictive terrain is the critical characteristic of mountain 
warfare; the unique atmosphere creates additional constraints on military operations.  
Strategists must consider both of these factors when contemplating warfare in high 
mountains.  A strategy that calls for the occupation of high altitude terrain, and defense of 
static positions, has seldom succeeded in high mountain wars.  At first glance, the 
possession of the high ground seems to offer an almost overwhelming advantage.  Yet 
possession of the high ground does not always yield an operational advantage; high 
mountains exact a price on a fixed force, exposing it to severe weather as well as enemy 
observation and fire.  The attrition caused by exposure to enemy firepower and the 
environment has led to the defeat of mountain fortifications in past wars, most notably 
the Greek Army’s Metaxas line in the Second World War. 
Bypassing the mountains and securing routes of access is not always a viable 
choice, especially in the case of India and Pakistan, in which the area of dispute consists 
                                                 
62 A light artillery battery may require up to sixty mules for transport.  Barry Gregory, Mountain and 
Arctic Warfare: From Alexander to Afghanistan, 174. 
63 Mohammad Yahya Nawroz, General, Army of Afghanistan (Retired), and Lester W. Grau, 
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of 
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mainly of high mountain terrain, the mere possession of which constitutes victory.  
Therefore, an army faced with a foe atop dominating heights may have no choice but to 
take the hill.  For the force tasked with dislodging an enemy atop high mountains, victory 
relies on the difficult task of integrating firepower and maneuver, as it does in warfare on 
any battlefield.  But high mountains significantly alter the conditions of combat, the 
systems that are best suited for delivery of firepower, and the tactics that enable 
successful maneuver.  Victorious armies have historically focused offensive operations 
on isolating enemy positions by gaining control of surrounding heights and passes, the 
key terrain that dominates a mountainous region.  Isolation further exacerbates the effects 
of the environment, degrading the enemy forces’ ability and will to fight.  Applying 




Mountainous terrain makes dismounted infantry the primary combatant on the 
high altitude battlefield.  The scarcity of trafficable roads and narrow mountain passes 
relegates armor and tracked vehicles to a limited role and increases their vulnerability to a 
lightly armed enemy.  Well-placed mujahadeen ambushes on rugged and narrow roads 
destroyed more than one thousand Soviet armored personnel carriers and more than 
eleven thousand trucks during a decade of war in Afghanistan.64  The lack of trafficable 
roads makes logistical support difficult.  Cross-country movement is equally demanding.  
Soldiers must be trained mountaineers in order to conduct, as well as support, military 
operations. 
Trained mountaineers allow an army to execute bold maneuver over the most 
difficult and unlikely terrain, the key to successful offensive operations in the mountains.  
Maneuver in the mountains therefore places a premium on the ability to install and use 
ropes to scale vertical cliffs.  From 1942 to 1944, the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain 
Division trained at Camp Hale, Colorado, in elevations that approached 12,000 feet 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
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(3,660 m) and winter temperatures that dropped to -20º C.65  Soldiers received extensive 
training in mountaineering skills and cold weather survival.  They arrived in Italy in 
December 1944 as perhaps the most skilled mountaineers on the peninsula.   
The 10th Mountain Division employed small, skilled units against static German 
positions atop high ground.  The 10th Mountain entered battle against German 
fortifications in the Apennines, at heights reaching 5,000 feet (1,500 m).  German 
positions included Mount Belvedere, which had beaten back three Allied attacks and 
appeared impregnable.66  The 10th Mountain commander, Brigadier General George P. 
Hays, ordered the 86th Infantry Regiment to seize Riva Ridge, a rocky, perpendicular 
slope, as a foothold to launch an attack on Mount Belvedere.  According to General Hays, 
“the Germans would never believe that anyone could scale it.”67  On the night of 18 
February 1945, the men of the 1st Battalion, 86th Infantry Regiment installed ropes and 
scaled the 1,500-foot vertical cliff under cover of darkness, surprised the German 
defenders at dawn and seized the ridge. 
The 10th Mountain Division’s operations in Italy exhibit the tactics that succeed 
against mountain positions.  Maneuver must be on an unexpected axis of advance; small 
units that execute multidirectional attacks can achieve tactical surprise, critical to success 
against heights.  The German Army’s own Field Service Regulation of 1933, written after 
extensive combat experience in the mountains of Europe during World War I, clearly 
stated the methods that achieve victory in the mountains:  
In restricted terrain the attacker often needs only a local and 
limited superiority in numbers and battle means.  
Apparently strong heights and rocky positions … can be 
made to fall if we succeed in enveloping, or turning these 
positions.68 
 
                                                 
65 Tom Jenkins, “The Assault on Riva Ridge,” American History (December 2001), 48. 
66 The 10th Mountain Division’s actions against Riva Ridge and Mount Belvedere were part of 
Operation Encore, an allied offensive in February 1945 that sought the capture of key terrain to set the 
stage for a larger spring offensive.  For further reading see Dwight Oland, North Apennines: The U.S. Army 
Campaigns of World War II, U.S. Army Center of Military History Publication 72-34 at 
<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/nap/72-34.htm> (April 2003). 
67 Barry Gregory, Mountain and Arctic Warfare: From Alexander to Afghanistan, 231. 
68 John F. Antal, Colonel, U.S. Army, “Busting Through,” Military Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January-
February 2000), 30. 
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2. Firepower 
Daring maneuver can only be successfully when it is supported by overwhelming 
firepower.  Artillery is the most effective and reliable method of delivery on the high 
altitude battlefield, because of its ability to concentrate sustained fire in varied terrain and 
harsh weather.  Artillery compensates for the loss of mobility and accuracy by offering 
concentrated and relentless fire, a capability unmatched by any other platform on the high 
altitude battlefield, including air power.  Organic artillery emerged as an indispensable 
component of forces built to fight in mountains.  Each Jaeger battalion carried its own 
internal light howitzers as well as mortars of varying caliber.69  Each regiment contained 
a mountain howitzer battery.  Most of the guns were light artillery of First World War 
vintage, which proved to be highly mobile and effective. 
The Jaeger became masters of integrating firepower and maneuver to destroy 
mountain defensive positions.  In April 1941, the 5th Gebirgs Division launched the first 
successful attack on permanent mountain fortifications by a light infantry force in the 
history of warfare.70  The series of concrete bunkers that formed the Metaxas Line 
stretched across the Rhodope Mountains in Macedonia.  The mountains reached an 
altitude of 6,500 feet (2,000 m) with little vegetation on the highest ridges and deep, 
narrow valleys.  The Greek Army considered the line to be impregnable.71    
The Jaeger initiated the assault with overwhelming fire support, firing heavy, 
long-range artillery from the valley floor.  They dismantled and carried mountain artillery 
guns to the high slopes by pack mule.  Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers attacked the pillboxes, 
but had difficulty acquiring the targets and did not destroy them.  Small infantry units 
pressed the attack, using mortars and heavy machine gun fire to suppress the bunkers.  
Jaeger dragged light artillery pieces within close range of the bunkers to provide direct 
fire.  The overwhelming suppressive fire of Stuka, mortars, and artillery allowed small 
                                                 
69 Each company had three light mortars and two 8-cm mortars.  The machine gun company had 
twelve heavy machine guns and four 12-cm mortars. The heavy weapons company had four light machine 
guns and two 7.5-cm howitzers.  Barry Gregory, Mountain and Arctic Warfare: From Alexander to 
Afghanistan, 173.  
70 James Lucas, Hitler’s Mountain Troops, 61. 
71 Ibid 49. 
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groups of Jaeger to maneuver and destroy the bunkers by assault.72  The Metaxas Line 
fell after four days of intense combat. 
 
3. Holding the High Ground 
The Greek Army’s failure to maintain the Metaxas Line provides a compelling 
example of the difficulty a static defender faces in a mountainous environment.  The high 
ground does not guarantee victory.  History provides examples of techniques that allow 
the defender to use the terrain to his advantage and defeat a foe that has superior 
firepower.  Defenders can use the reverse slope to protect soldiers from the effects of 
enemy firepower.  The reverse slope is the mountainside that descends away from the 
enemy.  Defending forces use the topographical crest to shield the defensive positions 
from observation and the effect of overwhelming firepower.  Armies have used this 
technique with great effect in previous mountain wars. 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China used the reverse slope defense 
during the Korean War to offset the U.S. Army’s overwhelming advantage in firepower.  
Chinese forces called the technique “front light, rear heavy,” and it halted numerous 
allied advances in the snow-covered mountains of Korea.73  The Japanese Army used 
ridgelines to mask the effects of U.S. firepower in the Philippines during the Second 
World War.  On Lane’s Ridge, in the mountains near Luzon, Japanese infantry units 
defended in depth; elements of the U.S. 6th Infantry Division encountered over fifty-five 
fortified positions on the reverse slope of the ridgeline.74  Japanese battalions stopped 
entire U.S. divisions and inflicted heavy casualties.  Using the terrain to mask the effects 
of firepower requires a large force due to the extension of the battlefield’s depth.  This 
requirement eliminates light, irregular forces from using the reverse slope technique as a 
general framework covering a large piece of terrain.  However, units lacking manpower 
                                                 
72 Ibid 53. 
73 A detailed description of the PLA’s defensive techniques can be found in Scott R. McMichael, 
Major, U.S. Army, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies 
Institute, 1987), 51-91. 
74 Light Infantry in Action at <http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/1-88/chpt3.htm> (December 
2002). 
26 
and heavy weapons can use terrain locally, in battle positions, to protect soldiers from the 
effects of enemy fire. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The successful integration of firepower and maneuver determine victory on the 
battlefield.  The high altitude environment alters the playing field, significantly changing 
the manner in which armies conduct military operations.  The atmosphere and terrain 
combine to degrade man and equipment alike, setting constraints on military planners and 
reducing available options.  Static forces fare worse than those that are on the offensive.  
Although the high ground affords command of large expanses of land, it also exposes 
men to the elements and the full brunt of massed enemy fire. 
Artillery has emerged over the course of man’s experience with war at high 
altitude as the most reliable means of firepower delivery.  Although it is limited in 
mobility and suffers erratic ballistic effects, light artillery has proven to be a decisive and 
devastating force in mountain warfare.  The campaigns of the 10th Mountain Division and 
5th Gebirgs Division displayed the effective marriage of overwhelming artillery support 
with bold maneuver in difficult terrain.  Trained light infantry, operating in small units, 
best performs the bold maneuver essential to gaining tactical surprise. 
Prior to the 1999 Kargil Conflict, the question of air power’s effectiveness on the 
high altitude battlefield had not been decisively answered.  Aircraft suffer multiple 
performance shortcomings in rarified air, as do artillery and all weapon systems designed 
for use at sea level.  The Soviet Union lost staggering numbers of high performance 
aircraft, as well as helicopter gunships, to mobile missile teams hidden among the Hindu 
Kush Mountains of Afghanistan.  The Kargil Conflict matched a modern air force and 
army against an irregular force entrenched atop imposing mountains.  The high altitude 
battlefield would degrade and limit both combatants, but exposure to the Himalayan 
environment would prove far more devastating to the NLI.  
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III. THE NORTHERN LIGHT INFANTRY AT KARGIL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After a bold and successful insertion in the spring of 1999, Pakistani forces 
occupied commanding heights in Indian-held Kashmir and gained an initial tactical 
advantage.  Pakistani soldiers seized peaks that dominated the Indian towns of Dras, 
Kargil, and the strategic Srinagar-Leh Highway, threatening India’s ability to reach its 
units deployed in Ladakh and on the Siachen Glacier.  But initial success did not translate 
into military victory.  India chose to retake the ground by force, and entered into a 
massive military campaign against the small band of raiders.  After seventy-four days of 
combat, the Pakistanis retreated back across the Line of Control (LOC).  How did the 
high altitude environment affect Pakistan’s military operations?   
The high altitude environment complemented Pakistani military capabilities in the 
campaign’s early stages.  Difficult terrain provided infiltration routes for a light infantry 
force.  The atmosphere and terrain enhanced the effects of Pakistani air defenses, 
reducing India’s asymmetric advantage of air power.  Well-placed artillery and heavy 
weapons balanced Indian superiority on the ground as well, defeating poorly planned 
assaults.  A limited arsenal atop decisive terrain yielded initial success, but it could not 
withstand critical miscalculations, the destructive nature of the environment, and an 
adaptive Indian military. 
Pakistan did not provide the manpower and logistical effort necessary to retain a 
high altitude belt of terrain.  A light infantry force that could slip past Indian border 
security could not hold terrain against a combined ground and air offensive.  An 
inadequate logistical effort exposed men to the environment’s impact with little means of 
protection.  Unable to rotate to lower altitudes, pockets of soldiers remained across the 
LOC for extended periods.  The thin air and frigid conditions of the Kargil battlefield 
gradually eroded the Pakistani soldiers’ health and combat effectiveness.  Weary men in 
static positions lost their fighting edge due to over-exposure, inadequate shelter, and 
malnutrition. 
28 
Military leaders exacerbated the environment’s effects by committing numerous 
tactical mistakes in the unforgiving mountain terrain.  Dispersed outposts, which were not 
part of a coherent defensive scheme that provided mutual support among positions, 
proved vulnerable to Indian firepower and maneuver.  Defenses afforded little depth and 
no flexibility, with small units assigned to retain areas too large for their manpower and 
firepower capabilities.  Most individual positions occupied the forward slope, which 
exposed soldiers to Indian fire.  The Indian Army eventually exploited these mistakes and 
forced a Pakistani withdrawal. 
 
B. THE NORTHERN LIGHT INFANTRY 
The desolate and rugged Northern Areas sit across the LOC from Kargil.  It is an 
autonomous region that is home to a Pakistan Army divisional headquarters, Forces 
Command Northern Areas (FCNA).  The headquarters commands three Pakistan Army 
brigades that are posted in the Northern Areas and responsible for maintaining security 
along the LOC.  The brigades routinely contained regular army battalions as well as 
battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), whose soldiers would bear the burden of 
seizing terrain across the LOC.75 
The NLI traces its lineage to scout units raised by the colonial British Army to 
patrol the Himalayan frontier.  In 1973 Pakistan reorganized three of these formations, 
the Karakoram, Northern and Gilgit Scouts, into the NLI.  The organization posted a 
headquarters at Bunji, in the Northern Areas, from which commanders supervised the 
unit’s primary task, border defense.  Over the years the NLI expanded training to include 
specialized missions such as mountain and arctic warfare.  The soldiers are local men, 
accustomed to the difficult terrain and high altitude atmosphere.  In 1999 the NLI’s 
officers were assigned from regular Pakistan Army infantry units, and routinely trained at 
the army’s elite schools, including a world-class mountaineering school in the Northern 
Areas.76   
                                                 
75 Prior to the Kargil Conflict the FCNA shared command of the NLI with the Ministry of the Interior. 
76 Pakistan conducts high altitude training in three to four month courses near the town of Astor in the 
Northern Areas.  The training is extensive and produces proficient mountaineers who are generally 
assigned to units, including the NLI, as instructors.  Robert Karniol, “Fighting on the Roof of the World,” 
30. 
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NLI battalions resemble Western light infantry battalions in size and structure, 
each holding approximately 600 men.  An NLI battalion consists of four rifle companies, 
each consisting of three platoons and a heavy weapons section.  Platoons have three 
sections and two light machine guns.  Each company has two 60-mm mortars.  The light 
infantry battalions have few organic combined arms assets.  The headquarters contains an 
81-mm mortar platoon with four tubes and an air defense section with four 12.7-mm 
machine guns.  Each battalion has an animal transport section, an essential source of 
mobility in the mountains.77 
Outside observers do not know the exact organization of the force that crossed the 
LOC.  Captured Pakistani soldiers and documents identified elements of the 4, 5, 6 and 
12 NLI battalions.78  A battalion of the Special Service Group (SSG), elite commandos 
trained in advanced mountaineering, and elements of the Frontier Corps of the Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP), the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts, augmented the NLI forces as 
well.79  Civilian militants, also known as mujahadeen, from the Northern Areas may have 
occupied outposts and engaged in combat.  The scope of mujahadeen involvement has 
been a continuing source of debate.  The Pakistani government initially claimed that 
uncontrollable bands of mujahadeen were responsible for the entire operation.80  
Whatever the exact composition, Indian intelligence sources estimated that the total force 
numbered approximately 1,700 men.81 
 
C. INFILTRATION IN THE HIGH MOUNTAINS 
The force conducted a phased infiltration, crossing the LOC in several different 
areas (see Figure 3).  Infiltration is a difficult and risky task, made more so by rugged 
mountain terrain and high altitude.  Few lanes exist for movement along the LOC.  Indian 
outposts on high ground observe large expanses of terrain.  Small units risk rapid 
                                                 
77 NLI task organization from Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “Appendix 5, 
Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry,” 297. 
78 Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil War,” 100. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “Appendix 12, Pakistan Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif’s Address to the Nation, 12 July 1999,” 325. 
81 Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil War,” 102. 
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isolation if detected.  Movement is slow and dangerous.  Despite the challenges, the NLI 
used difficult terrain and severe weather to its advantage.  Soldiers traveled on hazardous 
peaks and ridgelines, as well as large expanses of ground that went unobserved by Indian 
patrols and outposts. 
 
Figure 3.   NLI infiltration routes across the LOC. (From: Gurmeet Kanwal, Colonel, 
Indian Army, Heroes of Kargil (Delhi: Army Headquarters, 2002), 2) 
 
The groups infiltrated across the LOC over the course of several months in the 
spring of 1999.82  The NLI traveled in small formations of approximately thirty soldiers 
each.  Soldiers walked on ridgelines through gaps in Indian coverage created by the 
abandonment of outposts during the winter months.  They used mule teams and 
helicopters to carry equipment across the LOC.  Indian patrols spotted several Puma and 
Lama helicopters, which are capable of operating at extremely high altitudes, carrying 
loads of supplies across the LOC.83  NLI soldiers dismantled heavy equipment, including 
artillery pieces, for shipment into the area of operations by helicopter.  Pakistani 
helicopter pilots displayed their skill at high altitude, using “innovative techniques” to fly 
                                                 
82 The Kargil Review Committee Report, 88. 
83 An Indian Army patrol spotted seven Pakistani helicopters with slingloads in Turtok in late April.  
The French Aerospatiale Puma is a medium-sized, twin-engine transport helicopter with a service ceiling of 
19,680 feet (6,000 meters); the Aerospatiale Lama is a light single-engine helicopter with a service ceiling 
of 17,715 feet (5,400 meters), although the Pakistan Army reportedly flies it at 24,600 feet (7,500 meters) 
on the Siachen Glacier.  Ibid 99. 
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“along mountain peaks, careful not to be visible against the horizon.”84  Mules and 
porters pulled ammunition, heavy weapons, and light artillery as well. 
The NLI sought to avoid contact with the five battalions of the Indian Army’s 121 
Brigade that patrolled the LOC in Kargil.  The brigade’s patrol and outpost plan created 
80-km of uncovered gaps during the winter, when Indian outposts went unoccupied due 
to severe weather and hazardous conditions.85  Indian patrols focused on the streambeds 
that offered easier and faster avenues of approach, which are commonly called nullahs.  
Indian patrols generally avoided the rugged terrain and high winds on the ridgelines.  
Indian Army helicopters augmented the ground surveillance effort, conducting periodic 
aerial patrols throughout the winter.86  Snow-blindness limited the effectiveness of the air 
patrols, which focused primarily on the valley floors.  Winter Air Surveillance Operation 
(WASO) flights and Indian patrols failed to detect the NLI groups as they moved across 
the LOC.  Indian units reported sporadic activity and sightings, but commanders did not 
suspect a large-scale incursion.   
The NLI occupied approximately 130 posts in Indian-held Kashmir, creating a 
total frontage of about 150-km that varied in depth from 4 to 8-km across the LOC.  A 
force of more than 500 Pakistanis occupied Mushkoh Valley and Dras, establishing 
positions on Tiger Hill and Tololing that commanded the Srinagar-Leh Highway.  A 
smaller group of approximately 100 Pakistanis occupied positions 4-km deep in Kaksar, 
near the town of Kargil.  Further north, more than 250 Pakistanis moved into Batalik and 
Turtok, on the southern edge of the Siachen Glacier (see Appendix. Array of Forces 
During the Kargil Conflict).87  The NLI had seized the initiative with a successful 
insertion, and occupied dominating heights along the LOC.  The Pakistani soldiers faced 
the uncertainty of a massive Indian offensive to drive them off the peaks.  But the men 
                                                 
84 Quote taken from an unnamed Indian Army officer commenting on Pakistan pilot proficiency.  
Rahul Bedi, “Paying to Keep the High Ground,” 27. 
85 Gaps in Indian coverage varied from 36-km in the Mushkoh Valley to 9-km in Kaksar. Ashok 
Kalyan Verma, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), Kargil: Blood on the Snow, 86. 
86 Indian Army helicopters conducted six Winter Air Surveillance Operation (WASO) flights during 
the winter of 1999.  The Kargil Review Committee Report, 88. 
87 Estimates of group sizes from Ashok Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil 
War,” 102. 
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faced a certain and immediate threat, the debilitating effect of the high altitude 
environment. 
 
D. THE ENVIRONMENT’S TOLL 
Exposure to high altitude, cold weather and rugged terrain hindered several 
aspects of Pakistani operations.  Soldiers suffered substantial non-battle casualties before 
the Indian offensive began in late May.  Captured NLI soldiers and documents revealed 
that avalanches and severe blizzards in February and March inflicted numerous 
casualties.88  NLI soldiers attempted to build permanent positions with few available 
resources.  They carried fiberglass huts, snow tents and other permanent shelters.  They 
dug low trenches and constructed sangars on rocky slopes.89  They built makeshift 
overhead cover for protection from the elements as well as indirect fire.  These efforts 
failed.  Cement did not set properly because water froze immediately at nightfall.  
Sangars constructed of loosely fitted boulders collapsed on their inhabitants under fire.   
Prolonged exposure to high altitude degraded the health of all soldiers on the 
battlefield at Kargil, including the indigenous men of the NLI.  The NLI recruited the 
majority of its manpower from the Northern Areas, and most of its soldiers had grown up 
climbing the peaks around Gilgit.90  NLI soldiers were routinely stationed along the LOC 
and had probably acclimatized to the environment.  Many of the NLI’s officers were not 
native to the region and probably bore the brunt of illness caused by the extended 
deployment at high altitude.  A former NLI commander noted that the drastic change in 
elevation made eating and sleeping nearly impossible for the Pakistan Army officers 
assigned to outposts, even if acclimatization had occurred.91  Both officers and soldiers 
undoubtedly suffered because of the continuous nature of the deployment.  Ideally, 
soldiers in outposts rotate to lower altitudes every ten to fourteen days to minimize 
exposure.  A captured 5 NLI officer’s diary describes his company as containing seventy-
                                                 
88 The Kargil Review Committee Report, 228. 
89 Sangars are aboveground fighting positions built by piling stones and other building material above 
ground in rocky terrain where digging is impossible. 
90 55 percent of NLI soldiers were from Gilgit in the Northern Areas.  Ashok Krishna, Major General, 
Indian Army (Retired), “Appendix 5, Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry,” 297. 
91 Interview between Brigadier Feroz Khan and the author, 28 February 2003. 
33 
one men when it crossed the LOC.92  He evacuated twenty-five men due to illness before 
the Indian offensive began, and did not receive replacements. 
Pakistan failed to sustain the NLI soldiers, compounding the effects of the 
environment.  The occupied sector expanded beyond the capability of its logistical base.  
The band of NLI and civilian militants proved too small to occupy positions and act as 
fighting porters, responsible for their own logistical support.  Regular army battalions that 
remained in the Northern Areas did not improvise new lines of communication as the IAF 
eliminated existing ones.  The destruction of critical supply sites, such as Muntho Dalo, 
by the IAF effectively isolated many forward positions.  NLI soldiers survived on 
captured Indian rations when their supplies ran low, and many reportedly subsisted on a 
diet of sugar during the operation’s last days.93  But as the high altitude environment 
steadily degraded the NLI’s ability to fight and survive, it also played a critical role in 
reducing India’s overwhelming military advantage. 
 
E. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
Air power provided the Indian armed forces with an asymmetric advantage over 
the vulnerable NLI ground force.94  The Indian Air Force (IAF) engaged NLI ground 
forces absent the threat of interdiction by Pakistani air power.  However, the high altitude 
environment, coupled with the NLI’s skillful employment of surface-to-air weapons, 
diminished India’s asymmetric advantage and exposed vulnerabilities.  The IAF’s 
primary attack helicopter, the Russian-made Mi-25, was too heavy to fly at high altitude.  
Thin air reduced the accuracy of aerial weaponry.  Irregular and jagged terrain concealed 
Pakistani surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 
The NLI deployed significant air defense weapons to counter IAF aircraft.  
Elements of four missile and two gun batteries reportedly crossed the LOC with the 
                                                 
92 Ravi Rikhye, “The Northern Light Infantry in the Kargil Operations, 1999.” Bharat Rakshak 
Monitor Vol. 3, No. 6 (May-June 2001) at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-
6/rikhye.html> (April 2002). 
93 Ibid. 
94 A discussion of the concept of positive asymmetry afforded by technology or methods available to 
only one combatant in a conflict can be found in Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnston II, Asymmetry and 
U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2001). 
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NLI.95  Mobile teams hid in terrain folds and massed on peaks near defensive positions.  
The NLI position on Tololing alone fired twenty-five SAMs during the campaign, and 
Indian officials estimated that the Pakistani soldiers carried more than one hundred 
missiles to their outposts.96  The soldiers used the weapon systems effectively, and scored 
early hits that dramatically reduced the IAF’s combat role. 
Pakistani SAMs limited the IAF’s willingness to support Indian ground maneuver 
with the full complement of its capability and firepower.  Stinger missile teams destroyed 
an IAF MiG-21 and an Mi-17 attack helicopter during the initial days of air strikes.  The 
IAF’s response to the early losses significantly lessened its impact on the battlefield.  The 
IAF command suspended attack helicopter operations and imposed safe height 
restrictions on ground attack aircraft.97  The height restrictions placed aircraft out of 
reach of SAMs but also removed a large component of potential Indian firepower.  For 
the rest of the campaign, IAF aircraft would not fly at low altitudes to provide accurate 
fire for ground maneuver, focusing instead on supply sites and other fixed targets behind 
NLI positions.  The combination of NLI ground weapons, the high altitude atmosphere, 
and mountainous terrain placed limits on India’s air power.  But the NLI faced a far 
superior Indian ground force as well. 
 
F. GROUND COMBAT AT HIGH ALTITUDE 
The characteristics of the high altitude battlefield provided the NLI with an 
opportunity to lessen the disparity in firepower and force on the ground.  The 
compartmented mountain terrain made the concentration of firepower difficult, diluting 
India’s ability to mass the effects of both fire and force.  Terrain canalized the movement 
of large infantry formations, which allowed the smaller NLI force to inflict heavy 
casualties on its superior adversary.   The NLI skillfully applied limited resources in the 
early stages of the campaign, restricting the Indian military’s ability to maneuver and 
deliver direct fire.  It did not, however, possess the manpower required to hold a wide 
                                                 
95 The majority of Pakistani SAMs were U.S.-made FIM-92A Stingers.  Indian Army units captured a 
number of Chinese-made Anza Mark-II missiles as well.  Amarinder Singh, A Ridge too Far: War in the 
Kargil Heights 1999, 42. 
96 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Mountain Warfare and Tri Service Operations,” 25. 
97 Rahul Bedi, “Paying to Keep the High Ground,” 31. 
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expanse of mountainous terrain for an indefinite period of time.  Insufficient forces 
negated the NLI’s ability to adapt to the enemy, and removed the possibility of using the 
terrain to protect its overmatched force.  
 
1. Balancing the Close Fight 
The NLI went into action with its full complement of heavy weapons.  
Contending with an unrecoverable loss in aerobic capacity, soldiers managed to haul 
several heavy machine guns (HMG) and automatic grenade launchers (AGL) across the 
LOC.98  The Russian-made arms exceed sixty-five pounds in weight, and carrying their 
ammunition and accessories requires a team of soldiers or mules in mountainous 
terrain.99  The weapons can deliver devastating fire on advancing infantry or low-flying 
aircraft, but their size and weight make repositioning a time-consuming and difficult task.  
The NLI’s heavy weapons covered uphill approaches with direct fire and halted Indian 
assaults.  The NLI augmented this lethal capability with ample artillery support. 
A combination of Pakistan Army artillery and well-placed NLI indirect fire assets 
provided significant firepower to the NLI outposts.  The NLI’s array of organic mortars, 
capable of high-angle fire, provided responsive firepower as well.  Twenty artillery 
batteries reportedly provided direct support to the NLI.  Most of these batteries occupied 
positions in the Shingo Valley in the Northern Areas and shelled Indian targets in 
Dras.100  The NLI transported at least one of its three organic artillery batteries and 
several 120-mm mortar platoons across the LOC.  A detachment of three 105-mm guns at 
Point 4388, between Dras and the Mushkoh Valley, supported NLI positions on Tiger 
Hill and placed effective fire on the highway for two months.101  A mortar firing position 
that occupied a nearby nullah, or streambed, provided heavy volumes of fire as well.  
                                                 
98 At 14,000 feet (4,250 m) above sea level, the average altitude along the LOC, the soldiers suffered a 
minimum of 30 percent unrecoverable reduction in aerobic capacity.  This is unaffected by acclimatization.  
Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 34. 
99 The 12.7-mm HMG weighs 75 pounds (34 kilograms) without its tripod and ammunition; the AGS-
17 AGL weighs 66 pounds (30 kilograms), with each drum of ammunition weighing 32 pounds (15 
kilograms).  Mohammed Yahya Nawroz, General (Retired), Army of Afghanistan, and Lester W. Grau, 
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of 
Future War?” 
100 Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 376. 
101 Rahul Bedi, “Paying to Keep the High Ground,” 28. 
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Three 120-mm and two 81-mm mortars stopped Indian assaults on the Tiger Hill 
complex for several weeks.102  Well-developed mule tracks and wire communications 
connected the positions, which sat in nullahs protected by steep mountainsides.  
Coordinated indirect fire confused Indian offensives and inflicted heavy casualties. 
NLI guns that crossed the LOC kept the Indian Army off balance during initial 
attacks, engaging at short distances in indirect, high-angle mode.  Massed Indian troops 
provided the primary target, making the concentration of fire more necessary than 
accuracy.  Axes of advance offered little cover and concealment, and NLI mortars and 
artillery typically fired on the Indian soldiers throughout the entire length of their 
approach.  Doctors attributed over half of the Indian casualties evacuated to the military 
hospital at Leh to indirect fire.103  NLI artillery frustrated troop movements on the 
Srinagar-Leh Highway and destroyed the Indian Army's ammunition dump in the town of 
Kargil.  The firepower provided by NLI artillery and mortars thwarted initial Indian 
Army assaults, but it would not be enough for the undermanned force to hold its 
mountain outposts.  
 
2. Holding Ground in the Mountains 
The NLI engaged in an area defense to retain the occupied heights.  An overall 
defensive plan would have permitted the occupants of dispersed positions to fire into 
shared engagement areas and protect each other.  But no such larger defensive scheme 
materialized.  Occupied sectors consisted of a series of scattered outposts on ridgelines 
and peaks.  Due to limited manpower, NLI soldiers occupied static positions that lacked 
depth and allowed for little tactical flexibility.  Limited security forces, in the form of 
patrols and ambushes, occupied nullahs and other avenues of approach.  Pakistan failed 
to provide the manpower necessary to hold terrain in the difficult environment.  This 
failure prevented the NLI from implementing mountain warfare tactics proven in 
previous wars. 
                                                 
102 An Indian raid destroyed a Pakistani heavy mortar platoon firing position in the Safaid Nullah and 
Point 4388.  Amarinder Singh, A Ridge too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999, 195. 
103Ashok Kalyan Verma, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), Kargil: Blood on the Snow, 108. 
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Lightly armed defenders can use mountainous terrain to mask their positions from 
enemy observation and direct fire.  This method, known as the reverse slope defense, 
offered the NLI its best chance for success in the mountainous terrain along the LOC.  
The reverse slope defense gains effectiveness when adjacent positions provide 
interlocking fires, creating an engagement area on the forward slope.  Observation posts 
forward of the topographical crest watch the engagement area and call for indirect fire.  
The reverse slope method has clear advantages.  It creates tactical surprise and protects 
forces from direct and indirect fire.  It allows the defender to mass weapons effects on the 
reverse military crest.  But it has disadvantages as well.  Observation is restricted, and the 
topographical crest limits the range of direct fire weapons.  The enemy attacks downhill, 
a significant advantage in the thin air at high altitude.   
The NLI’s tactical situation favored use of terrain to protect its soldiers, but it did 
not possess the manpower necessary to implement it.  The reverse slope method gives the 
defender the advantage when the forward slope is exposed to enemy fire originating 
beyond the range of the defender’s weapons.  Direct fire from Indian long-range artillery 
destroyed many NLI positions on the forward slope.  Those positions that were not 
destroyed suffered under continuous suppressive fire, unable to engage advancing Indian 
infantry.  The NLI had no weapon to reduce the Indian Army’s standoff advantage.    
In addition to poor placement and insufficient manning, the NLI’s outposts 
suffered from several unique characteristics of defending a static position on the high 
altitude battlefield.  Towering heights along the LOC offered Pakistani positions nearly 
unlimited observation of the Indian Army’s approach, yet the difficulty of estimating 
range in the mountains diminished that advantage.  Indian soldiers reported that the NLI 
exhibited poor fire discipline, engaging targets at excessive distances and unnecessarily 
revealing their location.104  Ice fog and vapor trails, created by weapons fired in the cold 
air, hung over static NLI positions and gave away their location.  NLI defenders 
developed engagement areas that contained large areas of dead space unaffected by direct 
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fire.  Indian soldiers closed to within twenty yards of NLI bunkers before being engaged 
with effective fire, despite the presence of night vision devices in most NLI positions.105   
In most battles along the LOC, NLI tenacity and firepower stopped the Indian 
Army’s first attempts to dislodge them.  Over time, the Indian Army adapted its tactics to 
the landscape.  Indian Army units eventually overcame their initial failures and exploited 
NLI tactical errors.  Indian units isolated the lightly held positions by force.  Indian 
infantry battalions penetrated linear defenses and attacked assailable flanks.  The NLI’s 
limited manpower made recovery from its initial tactical mistakes impossible.  NLI 
forces had no choice but to withdraw once they were surrounded or cut in half.  This 
sequence of events occurred in the battle for Tiger Hill. 
 
G. TIGER HILL 
Tiger Hill stands 16,700 feet (5,062 m) high and overlooks Dras.  It is a massive 
terrain feature, approximately one kilometer wide at its base.  A high ridgeline, called the 
Western Ridge, extends to the west and contains several prominent features: India Gate, 
two rock structures that look similar to a gate; a large rock pile known as the Helmet; 
Rocky Knob; and Rhino Horn (see Figure 4).  Several peaks to the south of Tiger Hill 
provide observation of the surrounding valleys and ridgelines.  Point 4460 is one 
kilometer south of Tiger Hill, within supporting range of the NLI’s direct fire weapons.  
The Tingel Nullah divides the complex, and Hill 4875 and Point 4540 sit on its far side 
opposite Tiger Hill (see Figure 5). 




Figure 4.   Tiger Hill and Western Ridge, approaching from the south. (After: Ashok 
Krishna, Major General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil War,” 117) 
 
 
Figure 5.   Overhead view of the Tiger Hill complex. (After: Ashok Krishna, Major 
General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil War,” 94) 
 
The Indian Army estimated that an element of around one hundred men, roughly 
equivalent in size to an NLI rifle company, defended Tiger Hill and the Western 
Ridge.106  The commander dispersed his forces into section positions that each contained 
eight to ten soldiers.  Four sections occupied the hilltop.  The remainder of the group 
occupied trenches on Western Ridge, with a section at India Gate, Helmet and Rhino 
Horn.  The commander placed his headquarters with a group of around twenty soldiers at 
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the Rocky Knob, which fired across the front line of positions, creating an engagement 
area with interlocking fire.  A medium machine gun (MMG) watched the forward slope 
of Western Ridge.  An anti-personnel minefield blocked the approach from Point 4540.  
A 12.7-mm gun atop Trig Height, a peak that is two-kilometers northwest of Tiger Hill, 
provided additional heavy weapon support.  The artillery battery on Point 4388, as well 
as the nearby mortar position, fired into the engagement area as well.107 
The NLI’s linear positions on Western Ridge and Tiger Hill provided little depth 
to its array of outposts.  Forward security forces could have added depth to the linear 
defense, but the NLI did not deploy them in significant numbers.  Indian forces occupied 
Point 4460 against light resistance in late May, providing a significant base of fire for 
maneuver onto Tiger Hill.  The NLI also abandoned Point 4540.  Forces in a security 
zone could have slowed the Indian advance, and hindered their attempts to reposition 
forces on the few narrow and exposed areas that suit foot movement.  The NLI lost the 
initiative by surrendering control of these critical features and allowing the Indian Army 
to build combat power. 
The NLI soldiers on Tiger Hill managed to hold the Indian forces at bay for 
nearly a month despite their small numbers and tactical mistakes.  NLI soldiers skillfully 
camouflaged their positions, causing the Indian Army to underestimate their strength.  
Physically unprepared and poorly equipped soldiers of India’s 1 Naga and 8 Sikh 
conducted ill-conceived assaults against Tiger Hill in May.108  NLI fire support inflicted 
heavy Indian casualties.109  The Indian assaults failed, and the units surrounded Tiger 
Hill and dug in.  The NLI launched a series of counterattacks, but the thinly spread forces 
lacked the combat power to push the Indian battalions off the hill.  NLI soldiers even 
resorted to rolling boulders downhill on the Indian forces.110   
Exposure to massive Indian firepower and an inadequate force commitment 
emerged as critical tactical errors.  NLI sections occupied positions on the front slope of 
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Western Ridge and the hilltop.  Only one section occupied Tiger Hill’s reverse slope.  
The configuration exposed the vast majority of the soldiers to overwhelming Indian direct 
and indirect fire.  A massive artillery barrage, with as many as 1,200 rounds impacting 
every 5 minutes, preceded the final assault that forced an NLI retreat.111  The Indian 
Army found an assailable flank and launched a successful attack on Tiger Hilltop from 
the east.  Simultaneously, a small Indian raiding party penetrated the thin line of defense 
on the Western Ridge, splitting the position in half.  Despite brave but small 
counterattacks, the NLI could not push the Indian raiding party off the ridgeline.  Faced 
with certain defeat, the NLI abandoned its positions atop Tiger Hill on 8 July, leaving 
thirty-two dead soldiers behind. 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
The NLI demonstrated that holding the high ground does not necessarily ensure 
victory on the high altitude battlefield.  Even the existence of well-trained, indigenous 
men could not ultimately make the difference between victory and defeat.  The NLI 
masterfully infiltrated over seemingly impossible terrain and occupied commanding 
heights.  Outposts tucked into folds in rugged terrain limited the Indian military’s ability 
to focus its overwhelming firepower.  Indirect fire assets harassed Indian troop 
movements and defeated initial attacks.  The combination of NLI missile teams and thin 
air deterred the IAF and mitigated the NLI’s asymmetric disadvantage.  The NLI’s 
objective, to retain the heights, seemed tenable after India’s unsuccessful attacks in late 
May, with 1,700 soldiers firmly entrenched atop Himalayan peaks. 
The NLI used the high mountain terrain to its advantage in the initial stages of the 
battle, yet could not escape its detrimental effects.  Although the environment provided 
some benefits to the overmatched NLI force, the effects of high altitude gradually eroded 
the NLI’s ability to fight and survive.  Illness, caused by thin air and severe temperatures, 
rendered many units combat ineffective.  Soldiers remained on outposts indefinitely, and 
most went without food or water during the final days of the battle.  Inclement weather 
and barren terrain made defensive preparation an arduous task.  Inadequate manpower 
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and logistical support added to the misery of the men who occupied the outposts.  With 
supplies running low and the environment reducing its ability to fight, the NLI’s firm grip 
on the high ground became its only hope for victory.  Tactical errors, amplified by the 
unforgiving mountainous terrain, erased that advantage as well. 
The Indian Army exploited the NLI’s inability to adapt the full scope of its 
military operation to the environment.  Pakistan did not provide the logistic support 
necessary for the NLI soldiers to survive, let alone sustain military operations, at high 
altitude.  The force commitment did not match the objective, and the undermanned NLI 
force could not defend the full reach of its territorial gains.  A small and agile force 
designed to avoid detection could not withstand the combined effects of the environment 
and the Indian offensive.  Linear defenses, dispersed across peaks outside of supporting 
distance, offered little chance of success.  Indian assaults isolated the outposts and 
defeated them piecemeal.  The NLI exposed its soldiers to massive fire on the forward 
slope.  The harsh environment and a determined Indian Army ensured that the NLI would 









IV. THE INDIAN OFFENSIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Facing an unforeseen turn of events on the LOC, India chose to mount a military 
campaign to drive the Pakistani invaders off the mountains around Kargil.  The Indian 
Armed Forces quickly mobilized in Kargil and began the arduous task of clearing the 
heights.112  The effects of rapid deployment to the high altitude environment, coupled 
with tactics that did not fit the mountainous landscape, stalled India’s initial efforts.  
Adaptation to the harsh environment and the entrenched enemy force was essential to 
achieving victory.  Both the Indian Army and Air Force (IAF) gradually altered their 
approach to warfare at high altitude and ultimately drove the Pakistani forces back across 
the LOC.  How did the high altitude environment affect Indian military operations, and 
what modifications led to victory?  
The Indian campaign started slowly in the final days of May 1999, following the 
decision to use military force to evict the Pakistani intruders and restore the LOC.113  The 
Indian Army simply underestimated the Pakistani force dug in atop the peaks at Kargil.  
Initial assaults failed.  Soldiers rushed to the theater from low elevations arrived 
unacclimatized and ill equipped for the environment.  Infantry battalions launched uphill 
attacks without adequate artillery support.  The absence of crucial suppressive fire made 
Indian infantrymen vulnerable to withering fire from an enemy atop commanding 
heights.  The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) air campaign suffered early losses as well, as it 
discovered its training and equipment lacking in the high altitude atmosphere.  After 
losing three IAF aircraft to enemy fire in the first week of operations, the IAF imposed 
height limits on its aircraft that reduced their ability to deliver effective close air support 
(CAS) to maneuver units.114  The early rounds of fighting had not gone well for the 
Indian forces, and change was necessary to break the stalemate on the LOC.  
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The Indian Army modified its methods and achieved victory.  Units initiated 
acclimatization and training programs.  Commanders developed techniques for high 
altitude assault that featured small groups scaling vertical terrain.  Most importantly, the 
Indian Army coordinated overwhelming firepower with daring maneuver.  Massive 
artillery fire preceded all attacks.  The IAF innovated despite the limitations imposed by 
its command and the environment, successfully destroying Pakistani lines of supply.  
Indian aircraft provided a psychological advantage and isolated Pakistani positions; 
however, air power did not provide effective close support to maneuver forces. The 
combination of firepower, most of it provided by massed artillery, and bold, vertical 
maneuver eventually overcame Pakistani forces.  The suppressive fire of artillery 
emerged as a critical complement to ground maneuver, and overshadowed the IAF’s 
ability to provide CAS.  Adaptation succeeded, and by the end of July 1999 the Indian 
military had driven all Pakistani forces back across the LOC. 
 
B. RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO HIGH ALTITUDE 
Most of the Indian Army forces that deployed to Kargil were initially unprepared 
for the rigors of high altitude warfare.  8 Mountain Division deployed from the Kashmir 
Valley, where it was conducting counter-insurgency (CI) operations, to Dras in a matter 
of weeks.  Several of its infantry units were thrown into the battle with only a few days of 
preparation and given little time to acclimatize to the drastic change in altitude.  In the 
words of 56 Mountain Brigade commander, Brigadier Amar Aul, his brigade arrived in 
Kargil “without any acclimatization and therefore was not in a fit state to carry out 
operations.”115  Units designed to operate in the Himalayan environment, as well as those 
that were posted either along the LOC or on the Siachen Glacier, quickly adjusted to the 
altitude and terrain. 
The Indian Army battalions that initiated operations were primarily local units 
whose soldiers were accustomed to high altitude.  These units adapted quickly and helped 
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to contain the Pakistani forces in the campaign’s initial stages in early May.  Elements of 
the Ladakh Scouts, a local paramilitary force, augmented units in Batalik in May and 
provided immediate mountaineering expertise.116  In addition to the Scouts, elements of 
11 Gorkha Rifles (1/11 GR) assumed an immediate combat role, arriving from recent 
duty on the Siachen Glacier.  Most of the units that deployed into combat operations in 
Dras under 8 Mountain Division, however, did not have the benefit of specialized 
training or recent experience at high altitude.  These battalions would suffer from the 
effects of rapid deployment to the high altitude battlefield. 
The effects of rapid deployment from sea level to high altitudes contributed to the 
Indian Army’s initial failures.  Soldiers that deployed from the Kashmir Valley were 
physically unprepared for the high altitude environment.  Units were accustomed to 
sweltering mid-May temperatures at an elevation of 2,000 feet (600 m) in the valley, and 
faced a drastic change in both temperature and altitude in a matter of hours.  Indian Army 
doctrine calls for gradual increases in elevation over the course of a twelve-day 
acclimatization process.117  Few would receive the required time.  
Soldiers suffered from the effects of rapid altitude gain immediately.  1 Naga 
climbed 14,000 feet (4,260 m) in elevation in two days, occupying positions at an altitude 
of 16,000 feet (4,880 m) upon arrival into the sector.118  8 Sikh departed the Kashmir 
Valley on the morning of 14 May and reached the Zoji-La Pass at nightfall.  The next day 
they occupied positions near Dras at 15,000 feet (4,570 m) without time to acclimatize or 
acquire appropriate clothing and equipment.  The soldiers immediately suffered severe 
AMS symptoms.  Within two weeks, a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) in 8 Sikh 
died of HAPE.119   
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Frigid weather exacerbated the effects of thin air.  Temperatures that plummeted 
as low as –11ο C at night became a significant threat to soldiers arriving in Kargil.  
Defense Minister George Fernandes observed “unimaginable” conditions during a visit 
with Indian troops in May.120  Most soldiers did not have any type of shelter or extreme 
cold weather clothing to protect them from the elements.  18 Grenadiers arrived without 
sleeping bags.121  The army hauled reserve stocks of glacial clothing from the Siachen 
Glacier to Kargil to try to make up for the severe shortages, but could not outfit every 
man.122  As a result, cold weather produced casualties throughout the campaign.  Some 
Indian reports estimate that 26 percent of the Indian soldiers evacuated to the Military 
Hospital at Leh suffered cold weather injuries, primarily frostbite and chilblains.123 
In addition to the debilitating effects of the environment, a shortage of trained 
mountaineers hampered initial attacks.  Most of the infantrymen who deployed to the area 
did not possess the advanced mountaineering skills required to maneuver among the steep 
cliffs of Kargil.  121 Brigade received several battalions in the early stages of the 
campaign that lacked the training to move in mountainous terrain.  The commander 
requested the deployment of instructors from the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) 
located in Sonamarg, near Srinagar.124  The instructors spent the month of June training 
teams of soldiers from several battalions on the difficult skills of rock climbing and rope 
fixing.125  Meanwhile, soldiers from the battalions continued combat operations, despite 
a lack of skill in traversing the vertical cliffs.   
The rugged and isolated terrain of Kargil limited the Indian Army’s logistic 
capability as well, slowing initial deployments and making supply a difficult endeavor.  
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Soldiers often went without food for more than twenty-four hours during the first weeks 
of the campaign.  Adding to the logistical requirements, natural water sources 
disappeared quickly in mid-June when the snow melted.  The inability to transport 
sufficient quantities of water into the area forced many Indian units to restrict 
consumption to one liter per day, and many soldiers ate ice to quench their thirst.126  
Mules and porters formed a continuous line of supply between infantry units and their 
supply trains, which were typically separated by an eight to ten hour climb.127  The army 
organized the citizens of Ladakh into porter companies to make up for the manpower 
shortage.  The Indian Army estimated that at least one male member of every household 
served as a porter.128  The detrimental effects of the environment would be compounded 
by significant tactical errors that figured prominently in the Indian Army’s dismal 
performance in its first assault on Tololing. 
 
C. DEFEAT ON TOLOLING 
56 Mountain Brigade arrived in the Dras sector in mid-May and immediately 
began planning the clearance of the Tololing complex, a critical objective that Indian 
Army officials viewed as the most strategic terrain in Dras.129  Pakistani positions atop 
Tololing, as well as an adjoining ridgeline known as Point 5140, formed the deepest 
incursion into Indian territory and allowed the NLI to target indirect fire onto the 
Srinagar-Leh Highway (see Figure 6).  Indian Army leaders also hoped Tololing would 
be a foothold from which they could launch subsequent attacks on other enemy positions 
on the surrounding peaks.  But the Pakistani positions would not fall quickly.  The first 
Indian attacks on Tololing failed, as unprepared infantry battalions conducted uphill 
assaults during daylight.  Maneuver, without the support of sufficient firepower, proved 
incapable of retaking the heights. 
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Figure 6.   Overhead view of the Tololing complex. (After: Ashok Krishna, Major 
General, Indian Army (Retired), “The Kargil War,” 94) 
 
56 Mountain Brigade committed two infantry battalions, 18 Grenadiers and 1 
Naga, to the capture of the Tololing complex.  18 Grenadiers, commanded by Colonel 
Khushal Thakur, would capture Tololing Top and 1 Naga, under Colonel D.A. Patil, 
would capture Point 5140.  The brigade’s five artillery batteries would support both 
attacks.  However, the plan did not call for heavy artillery fire preceding or 
accompanying the infantry assaults, which were to be made up steep, unprotected terrain 
in full view of Pakistani positions.  Initial intelligence estimated that the position 
contained ten enemy soldiers with small arms.130  As the battle unfolded, it became 
apparent that the Pakistani position was far more substantial, equipped with heavy 
machine guns, mortars, and automatic grenade launchers.131 
The brigade initiated the attack on the Tololing complex on the night of 22 May.  
The two columns of 18 Grenadiers advanced along an open avenue of approach that 
afforded no cover from Pakistani fire.  Pakistani positions were well fortified and 
withstood light and sporadic Indian artillery fire.132  Indian Mi-17s, armed with machine 
                                                 
130 L.N. Subramanian, “A Ridge Too Far: The Battle for Tololing,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor Vol. 3,  
No. 6 (May-June 2001) at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-6/lns.html> (April 2002). 
131 Once the fight began, Indian Army officials increased their estimate to forty-five enemy soldiers 
armed with 12.7-mm machine guns, 81-mm mortars and 30-mm AGS-17 Plamya automatic grenade 
launchers. Prasun K. Sengupta, “Mountain Warfare: The Kargil Experience,” 44. 
132 Harinder Baweja, A Soldier's Diary: Kargil, The Inside Story, 42. 
49 
guns, did not provide effective fire support.  In contrast, the NLI delivered heavy 
volumes of mortar and artillery fire upon 18 Grenadier’s columns.  Movement was slow 
and painful, as men crawled up rocky cliffs under intense fire.  It would have taken at 
least eleven hours for an acclimatized soldier to climb to the top of Tololing without the 
presence of enemy fire.133  After a week of inching forward, heavy fire stopped both 
columns’ advance.134  A final assault in early June ended in disaster, with the deaths of 
the second in command of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Vishwanathan, and 
sixteen grenadiers.  After eight days in contact, the Grenadiers had suffered more than 
one hundred fifty casualties and had failed to take Tololing.   
1 Naga fared little better in its attack on Point 5140, the highest enemy position in 
the Tololing complex.  The battalion ascended under cover of night, but the 
unacclimatized soldiers moved forward slowly on a 6,500-foot (2,500 m) climb.  Soldiers 
advanced on all fours, digging footholds with entrenching tools.  The battalion did not 
reach the summit before dawn.  At daylight, Pakistani positions engaged 1 Naga with 
heavy fire, halting the advance. 
The Indian Army’s initial campaigns failed because planners did not adapt 
military operations to the high altitude battlefield.  Most units attacked during daylight, 
vulnerable to enemy observation and intense fire.  Unacclimatized soldiers struggled to 
advance over difficult terrain.  Most importantly, battalions did not have the support of 
overwhelming firepower essential to overcoming the NLI’s terrain advantage.  18 
Grenadiers and 1 Naga went into the attack with only five artillery batteries in support, 
which could not provide the volume of fire required to either suppress or destroy the 
Pakistani positions.  Close air support did not materialize.  Indian attacks on nearby Tiger 
Hill, the most dominating feature in Dras, met the same fate.  By early June the Indian 
Army’s campaign had stalled, unable to achieve its initial objectives.  The Indian Army 
was losing the fight against both the environment and the NLI, and a change in methods 
would be essential to prevent defeat. 
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D. TURNING THE TIDE: OFFENSIVE TACTICS 
Units that deployed to Kargil in early May suffered several disadvantages.  
Soldiers arrived ill equipped for survival in the harsh Himalayan landscape, much less up 
to the task of defeating a determined foe atop the heights.  Units that began to arrive in 
June adapted to the environment and applied the tactical lessons of the early failures.  
Initial operations illustrated that massive firepower was essential to permit the infantry to 
scale the heights.  The army massed artillery regiments in Kargil, and infantry battalions 
retooled their approach to high altitude tactics.  The experience of 2 Rajputana Rifles (2 
RAJ RIF) provides an example of a unit that made the right adjustments, and whose 
victory provided a turning point in the conflict. 
 
1. The Capture of Tololing 
2 RAJ RIF, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) M.B. Ravindranath, 
prepared his unit for ground combat at high altitude and won a series of impressive 
victories.  2 RAJ RIF deployed to Sonamarg from the Kashmir Valley, where it was 
conducting CI operations.  The battalion remained in Sonamarg for a few days before 
departing for the combat zone in Dras.  At Sonamarg LTC Ravindranath initiated 
planning, forming teams of senior leaders charged with creating a mountain assault 
doctrine, an acclimatization program, and a logistic support plan.135  These efforts proved 
to be the determining factor in the battalion’s success.  The battalion requisitioned large 
quantities of cold weather gear, and limited soldiers’ load to a light assault kit during the 
attack.136  The acclimatization program, condensed to eight days from the army standard 
of twelve, resulted in no high altitude illnesses in the battalion throughout the operation 
(see Table 1).  The most significant product of the battalions’ preparation was its 
approach to high altitude tactics, which it would test on Tololing. 
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1-2 Normal road walks with no change in elevation 
3-4 Gradual climbing 
5-6 Climbing without loads to 15,000 feet 
7-8 Climbing to 15,000 feet with full battle load 
Table 1.   2 RAJ RIF Acclimatization Program. (From: Amarinder Singh, A Ridge 
Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999, 195) 
 
LTC Ravindranath reported to 56 Mountain Brigade on 3 June and received the 
order to seize Tololing.  18 Grenadiers, still sitting under fire around the peaks and 
unable to advance, would support 2 RAJ RIF’s attack with suppressive fire.  Twenty 
artillery batteries totaling over 120 guns would support the operation as well.  After a 
thorough reconnaissance, LTC Ravindranath identified two avenues of approach to the 
Pakistani positions, over which he could launch multi-directional attacks and achieve 
surprise.137  He established ammunition and water supply points on each axis.  The 
battalion ferried equipment forward along the approach for two days before the assault.  
Mules carried the battalion’s machine guns, mortars and ammunition up only a third of 
the route.  Porters had to take over at that point, making a treacherous seven-hour uphill 
climb.  The altitude and terrain restricted porters to making only one trip per day, and 
forced Ravindranath to use as many as sixty porters continually on each axis.  The task of 
transporting water alone required twenty men daily.   
On the night of 12 June, a massive six-hour bombardment by all twenty artillery 
batteries preceded the assault.  The companies moved quickly on both axes of advance.  
Fire by 18 Grenadiers and the artillery batteries allowed Ravindranath’s troops to seize 
their initial objectives in a matter of hours.  The artillery barrage continued unabated until 
soldiers reached to within 200 meters of their objectives; at that point, 18 Grenadiers 
picked up a heavy volume of fire that effectively suppressed the Pakistani positions.  By 
early morning the battalion had captured Tololing Top and beaten back several desperate 
Pakistani counterattacks.138  Point 5140 fell a week later, on 20 June, following another 
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multi-directional attack supported by the full complement of twenty artillery batteries.  2 
RAJ RIF had given the Indian Army its first major victory in the war, and provided the 
foothold to move forward to other objectives, primarily the commanding heights of Tiger 
Hill. 
 
2. Victory at Tiger Hill 
Following the decisive victory on Tololing the Indian Army seized the initiative 
and began the methodical clearance of the peaks around Kargil.  The army launched 
attacks throughout the sector, from Tiger Hill in Dras to the glaciated landscape of the 
southern Siachen Glacier.  The attacks followed the same successful pattern that had been 
established on Tololing.  Infantry battalions advanced on unexpected, and therefore 
difficult, avenues of approach, supported by overwhelming artillery fire.  Multi-
directional attacks produced the element of surprise.  Daring nighttime maneuver over 
steep terrain, in coordination with massive firepower, broke NLI defenses in all areas.   
8 Sikh had attempted to scale the heights of Tiger Hill in late May, only to be 
repulsed by heavy artillery and small arms fire.139  Poorly coordinated assaults initiated 
without adequate artillery support failed under heavy fire from an entrenched enemy.  
Unable to press the attack, the soldiers dug in and surrounded the hill.  192 Mountain 
Brigade assumed command of the operations at Tiger Hill in late June, and received 18 
Grenadiers, fresh from participating in the victory at Tololing.  18 Grenadiers picked up 
the assault, supported by the concentrated fire of twenty-two artillery batteries and 8 
Sikh.  In freezing rain on the night of 3 July, 18 Grenadiers launched an assault on the 
16,700-foot (5,062 m) Tiger Top that began with a twelve-hour, vertical climb using 
fixed ropes. 
18 Grenadiers achieved surprise and made initial gains, yet the assault stalled near 
the top under heavy resistance.  Sensing the loss of initiative, Major Ravinder Singh of 8 
Sikh launched a daring attack.  He and a detachment of fifty-two soldiers climbed up the 
side of the adjoining Western Ridge, splitting the Pakistani defense on the night of 5 July.  
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The group held off several counterattacks.  Most of the Sikh soldiers attacked without 
cold weather gear, and many of the wounded died from exposure.140  After three more 
days of heavy fighting, the bold plan paid off, and 18 Grenadiers resumed the attack on 
an NLI force facing attack from two directions.  18 Grenadiers seized Tiger Hill Top on 
the morning of 8 July.  Daring maneuver on an unexpected approach, in coordination 
with overwhelming firepower, had ended the stalemate on Tiger Hill. 
 
3. Attack on “Balal Post” 
The southern Siachen Glacier area, north of the Shyok River, had been the scene 
of continuous activity since the battle for the Saltoro Ridge began in 1984.  Combat 
action in the area, which came to be known as “Sub-sector Haneef,” was technically not 
part of Operation Vijay, yet one daring Indian attack stands as an amazing example of the 
benefit of mountaineering expertise.141  Pakistani soldiers occupied a feature that they 
called “Balal Post,” which at 19,000 feet (5,770 m) is one of the highest points on the 
Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), the boundary that divides the Siachen Glacier.  27 
Rajputana (RAJPUT), in the process of induction into the sector, received the order to 
seize “Balal Post.”   
The battalion commander, Colonel K.H. Singh, divided an attack force into four 
elements: an eight-man assault team; a seven-man rope-fixing party, composed of two 
High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) trainers and five Ladakh Scouts; a twelve-man 
fire support party with heavy and medium machine guns; and a reorganization party 
containing twenty-one men.142  The rope-fixing team required four full days to install the 
thirty ropes necessary to reach the last ridgeline before the summit.143  On 27 June, Major 
N.S. Cheema led the group on a 1,800-foot near-vertical climb to the top of the “Balal 
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Post” that required thirty fixed ropes and achieved complete surprise.  The assault force 
quickly swept the objective, defeating a squad of NLI soldiers, and occupied the position.   
 
4. Mountaineering Under Fire 
As the battles on Tololing, Tiger Hill and “Balal Post” had shown, unexpected 
directions of attack are typically near-vertical cliffs on the high altitude battlefield.  Early 
attacks illustrated the futility of advancing against Pakistani positions on open avenues of 
approach during daylight.  Success required coordinated assaults from different and 
unanticipated directions.  The element of surprise proved essential to defeating an 
adversary atop heights, and made night movement a necessity.  Indian Army doctrine that 
set a 9:1 force ratio against defensive positions at high altitude proved to be accurate.144  
According to an unidentified Indian Army major, “a single night-time operation may see 
as many as a thousand men moving against a single post occupied by only ten people.”145  
The high altitude environment made the assault difficult for Indian soldiers, yet also 
yielded certain advantages.  Mountaineering at night, usually under fire, proved to be a 
difficult and time-consuming task, with each climber requiring five additional men to 
secure his ropes.  But nighttime also gave the Indians an advantage.  The night sky 
silhouetted Pakistani positions.146  Poorly placed Pakistani machine guns left large areas 
of uneven terrain not covered by direct fire.   
Indian infantry battalions eventually developed effective tactics for offensive 
operations at high altitude.  Units bypassed Pakistani positions, cutting off supply routes.  
The IAF’s air campaign against Pakistani supply lines further isolated the enemy pockets.  
Once isolated, the Indian Army wore down the defenders with overwhelming firepower, 
primarily a combination of direct fire and artillery.  Artillery proved to be the most 
effective and reliable source of suppressive fire.  Indian infantry battalions conducted 
multi-directional attacks after extensive artillery preparation.  The ability to traverse steep 
terrain allowed infantry formations to envelope Pakistani positions, attacking an 
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assailable flank rather than engaging in murderous frontal assaults against heavy fire.  
Soldiers typically climbed near-perpendicular cliffs throughout the night, attacking the 
Pakistani positions at first light.  Once at the objective, combat was typically at close 
quarters.  Every aspect of the attack depended on outstanding small unit leadership.  
Mountaineering training, as well as capable force multipliers such as HAWS instructors 
and Ladakh Scouts, proved to be essential elements of success.  Daring maneuver, 
however, would not have been successful without overwhelming firepower, and the main 
source of that was artillery.  
 
E. THE DOMINANCE OF ARTILLERY 
Artillery emerged as the primary source of firepower on the high altitude 
battlefield.  Massive artillery barrages provided the cover of suppressive fire under which 
Indian infantry advanced.  Indian batteries engaged in both direct and indirect fire, and 
produced devastating effects.  Without artillery fire, Indian infantry stood no chance of 
taking the heights, as they were vulnerable to Pakistani forces firing freely down upon 
them while they made the slow and difficult trek up the slope.  Recognizing this need 
after early setbacks, the Indian Army deployed fifteen artillery regiments containing over 
three hundred artillery pieces to the theater.  Indian artillery fired more than 250,000 
rounds over the course of the campaign.147    
The limitations imposed by the high altitude battlefield hampered India’s artillery 
efforts.  Firing positions were difficult to find and occupy.  Heavy artillery pieces were 
cumbersome and hard to move, especially on rugged trails.  Mortars expended their 
supply of ammunition quickly, and relied heavily on porters and infantrymen to carry 
extra rounds.  Projectiles behaved erratically in the air, requiring trial-by-error registering 
of guns to determine the deviations in distance.  Difficulty in estimating ground 
maneuver time in the mountainous terrain rendered time-synchronized fire plans 
ineffective as well.148  These obstacles, however, did not prevent artillery from proving 
itself as an indispensable complement to ground maneuver in the mountains. 
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The Indian Army utilized a wide variety of artillery pieces and mortars in Kargil.  
Light and agile weapon systems that could be transported on trails by mule teams or 
porters provided reliable support to infantry battalions.  Several batteries of vintage 130-
mm M-46 field guns, as well as 105-mm Indian Field Guns (IFG), fired in coordination 
with ground assaults.  The lightweight Russian-designed M-46, which had been in service 
with the Indian Army for decades, once again proved its worth on the battlefield.149  Its 
ability to fire rapidly at low angles made it an indispensable source of close range fire 
support, and harkened back to the German mountain guns that devastated Greek defenses 
with direct fire during the Second World War.150  The high-angle fire of 120-mm heavy 
mortars, as well as light mortars carried by the infantry battalions, delivered responsive 
and accurate firepower.  Artillery regiments used combinations of these weapon systems 
to provide sustained artillery barrages in support of ground maneuver.  No single artillery 
piece proved more valuable than the Bofors FH-77B 155-mm howitzer. 
The controversial Bofors FH-77B emerged as the Indian Army’s most reliable 
and lethal artillery piece on the high altitude battlefield of Kargil.151  Its long-range, 
heavy caliber shell readily destroyed poorly constructed fighting positions.  Indian 
batteries reported that the 24-km maximum range at sea level extended beyond 40-km in 
the thin air of Kargil.152  The concentrated fire of multiple batteries overcame the loss in 
accuracy that accompanied the increase in range.  One of the howitzer’s most important 
features became its ability to execute high-angle fire.  The tube could be elevated to 
angles over 70ο, making it capable of shooting over the high mountain crests of Kargil.  
Infantry battalions grew to rely on the devastating fire of the Bofors, so much so that 
Major General (MG) Mohinder Puri, commander of 8 Mountain Division, commented, 
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“the infantry started taking Bofors as their section weapon.”153  The Indian Army 
deployed over 130 Bofors guns to Kargil, and most of them came under the command of 
one of the army’s most innovative leaders, Brigadier Lakhinder Singh. 
Singh earned the nickname “Enraged Bull of Dras” for his technique of applying 
overwhelming firepower in support of infantry maneuver, which he compared to using a 
“sledgehammer to shell a peanut.”154  As commander of 8 Mountain Division's Artillery 
Brigade at Dras, he played a pivotal role in the conflict’s most important battles.  Singh 
lined all the guns in his batteries and concentrated direct fire on Pakistani positions.  He 
first used the technique during the assaults on Tololing in early June, firing over one 
hundred guns at Point 5140.155  The ferocity of his direct fire on Point 4875 in the Tiger 
Hill complex caused the Indian Army to rename the point “Gun Hill.”156  Brigadier 
Singh’s batteries fired 9,000 rounds on Tiger Hill during a single day of the attack.157 
Artillery became the most reliable and effective method of firepower at Kargil, 
determining the success of infantry assaults by providing time and space for maneuver.  
MG Puri credited his division’s victories to “the preponderance of the artillery fire” 
provided by Singh’s batteries.158  Pakistani soldiers feared it as well.  An NLI soldier 
atop Tiger Hill reported in an intercepted radio transmission that “hell has fallen on us” 
when Indian artillery fire commenced.159  Direct fire produced the most significant 
results, destroying Pakistani positions on the forward slopes.  Artillery demonstrated its 
value on the high altitude battlefield, creating conditions that allowed Indian infantry to 
advance and take the heights.  Air power, on the other hand, established a less conclusive 
record of performance during the Kargil Conflict. 
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F. AIR POWER 
The Indian Air Force (IAF) initiated operations in Kargil reluctantly.  Self-
imposed restrictions in response to early aircraft losses, coupled with the effects of the 
environment, reduced the effectiveness of air power.  Attack helicopters played virtually 
no role, too heavy or vulnerable to fly at high altitudes.  Fixed wing aircraft flew far 
above target areas to avoid surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  The increase in release 
altitude added to the inaccuracy of aerial-delivered munitions, reducing the effectiveness 
of close air support (CAS) to infantry units.  The IAF’s contribution grew as the 
campaign wore on, and aircraft armed with laser-guided munitions (LGM) eventually 
destroyed virtually all of the Pakistani supply lines and played a major role in the battle 
for Tiger Hill.  Yet despite these successes, and the psychological impact of aerial 
firepower on Pakistani morale, the IAF did not provide reliable close support to ground 
maneuver. 
The Indian military campaign began with significant disagreement among the 
services.  IAF doctrine placed air superiority, destruction of the enemy’s air power, as its 
first priority in an offensive operation.160  The army, on the other hand, emphasized the 
urgent need for CAS, citing the absence of an immediate Pakistani air threat in Kargil as 
justification.161  The IAF reportedly attempted to avoid involvement in the conflict 
altogether, claiming inexperience in mountain warfare and unfamiliarity with the terrain, 
as well as the risk associated with the heightened SAM threat in the mountains.162  The 
prohibition on crossing the LOC further limited the IAF’s ability to respond in 
accordance with its doctrine, eliminating the capacity to interdict lines of communication 
deep within Pakistani territory. 
The IAF eventually relented and initiated its air campaign, Operation Safed Sagar 
(White Sea), on 26 May 1999.  The Western Air Command deployed eight squadrons, 
which operated approximately sixty aircraft from the Srinagar air base and the Avantipur 
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airfield near Kargil.  Most of the fleet of ground attack aircraft were Russian-made and 
included MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27s.  A squadron of Mirage 2000 aircraft, which 
were of French origin and more advanced than the Russian-made jets, deployed to the 
airbases as well.  In addition to fixed wing aircraft, the IAF deployed several Mi-17 
helicopters, which could provide both lift and ground attack with a machine gun and 
rocket pods.163 
 
1. Helicopters at High Altitude 
The IAF and Army Aviation Corps (AAC) helicopter fleets made significant 
contributions as transport platforms, performing 2,185 sorties during Operation Safed 
Sagar, most of them in a support role.164  Transport helicopters carried more than 900 
casualties and 300 tons of supplies.165  Two of the AAC’s Reconnaissance and 
Observation (R&O) squadrons employed their reliable HAL Cheetah helicopters as 
Forward Air Controllers (FAC) to direct artillery fire onto enemy targets, a task that 
required them to fly as high as 23,000 feet (7,010 m).166  Larger Mi-17 helicopters 
contributed in a support role, with a high service ceiling of approximately 18,380 feet 
(5,600 m).167  They would not, however, perform well in the ground attack role.     
The IAF's fleet of attack helicopters proved lacking in operational capability at 
high altitude.  Heavily armed Mi-25 attack helicopters were unable to fly at high altitude 
because of their excessive weight, and were not deployed to Kargil.  The IAF attempted 
to conduct CAS with Mi-17s armed with rocket pods and machine guns.  During the first 
two days of air operations Mi-17s conducted strikes on several Pakistani positions in 
Dras.  On 28 May a Pakistani shoulder-fired missile destroyed one of the Indian Mi-17s 
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near Tololing, killing its four-man crew.  In response the IAF suspended attack helicopter 
operations.168  
The decision to cease attack helicopter operations proved controversial.  Senior 
IAF officers complained that the Mi-17s could provide responsive firepower, and that 
operations should have continued despite the SAM risk.169  The density of Pakistani 
SAMs, as well as the ease of concealment in irregular mountain terrain, made attack 
helicopter operations a risky endeavor.  Even without the SAM threat, IAF attack 
helicopters were not effective at high altitude.  Indian Army soldiers observed that the 
few Mi-17 CAS missions carried out were ineffective, most likely due to “running 
gunfire” techniques necessitated by the SAM threat and the difficulty of hovering in thin 
air.170  The IAF restrictions on attack helicopters would not be as controversial as the 
impact of fixed wing aircraft in the ground support role. 
 
2. Strike Missions 
Analysis of CAS missions during Operation Safed Sagar is difficult due to the 
lack of publicly available information on battle damage assessment (BDA), and therefore 
depends primarily on the eyewitness accounts of both IAF and Indian Army personnel.  
These viewpoints may be affected by service bias.  However, given the information 
available, it is apparent that air operations did not have the intended impact.  The IAF 
was not fully prepared to provide close air support (CAS) on the high altitude battlefield, 
and the reaction to early losses diminished its effectiveness.  Innovative methods 
achieved success against fixed targets but did not deliver effective CAS to ground 
maneuver forces.  
The loss of three aircraft, including the Mi-17, in the first three days of Operation 
Safed Sagar shocked the IAF and forced an immediate evaluation of tactics.171  On 27 
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May, the second day of air strikes, an IAF MiG-27 crashed due to engine failure.  A 
Pakistani SAM downed a MiG-21 later the same day, during the recovery operation, 
killing the pilot.  In response the IAF imposed limits on weapons release altitude that 
placed most aircraft at 30,000 feet (9,140 m) to avoid the Pakistani SAM threat.172  
While the IAF continued to provide CAS, it shifted the focus of operations to fixed 
targets, such as supply sites, and initiated night combat operations for the first time in its 
history.173 
The high altitude atmosphere severely degraded the accuracy of aerial munitions.  
Most of the ordnance dropped by IAF aircraft during more than 550 strike missions was 
not precision-guided.  Army reports claim that of over eighty CAS missions in the month 
of June, only twelve projectiles landed near the target, with no direct hits.174  Introduction 
of the Mirage 2000, which was capable of delivering 1,000-pound bombs with laser-
guidance kits, improved accuracy against fixed targets.175  Mirage aircraft attacked 
twenty-five ground targets, including the two main Pakistani supply sites, Mantho Dalo 
in Batalik and Point 4388 in Dras.176  Mirage aircraft flew CAS missions in support of 
the attack on Tiger Hill as well, destroying an NLI battalion headquarters and causing 
considerable damage to enemy forces.177 
Reports indicate that the IAF had conducted little CAS training in the high 
altitude environment prior to Operation Safed Sagar.  The IAF operated an air-ground 
firing range in Ladakh, but training was infrequent and typically did not focus on 
integration with the army.178  The two services lacked interoperable equipment, and as 
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one senior IAF officer put it, the IAF had not equipped or “trained itself for close support 
tasks with the army.”179  The need to both find and attack targets in mountainous terrain, 
relying primarily on information from ground forces, made CAS all the more difficult.  
Army officials reportedly called off several CAS missions early in the campaign because 
the inaccurate strikes were threatening Indian troops on the attack.180 
Unpredictable weather, equipment shortcomings, and altitude restrictions reduced 
the effectiveness of the CAS effort and heightened tensions between the services.  Army 
officers contend that they often halted advancing columns to wait for IAF missions that 
were ultimately ineffective.181  The IAF’s MiG fleet lacked electronic countermeasures to 
defeat SAMs, and displayed poor low-speed aerodynamics, which hindered their ability 
to operate in the environment and deliver accurate strikes.182  Brigadier Aul, commander 
of 56 Mountain Brigade, attributed the failings of CAS to the pilots’ unwillingness to 
“take reasonable risks,” adhering to safe height restrictions.183   
The prohibition on crossing the LOC affected the IAF’s ability to engage fixed 
targets as well.  Many Pakistani supply sites were located across the LOC in the Northern 
Areas and were therefore off-limits.  The increased turning radius caused by the high 
altitude atmosphere placed many targets in Kargil off-limits, because the LOC could not 
be crossed.184  The IAF compensated by developing innovative techniques to degrade 
NLI logistics.  Aircraft utilized carefully aimed projectiles to initiate landslides and 
avalanches, covering Pakistani supply lines.185 
The IAF eventually adapted to both the environment and its own constraints. 
MiG-21 pilots overcame the lack of navigational equipment, using a stopwatch and a 
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global positioning system (GPS) receiver to navigate and acquire targets at night.186  The 
Mirage 2000 produced the most successful performance, and became the workhorse of 
Operation Safed Sagar.  Air Chief Marshall Ajay Yashwant Tipnis observed that the 
Mirage 2000 proved itself as a “superior aircraft.”187   
Operation Safed Sagar succeeded against fixed targets, and had an undeniable 
psychological effect on both the NLI and the Indian soldiers below.  Senior leaders of 
both services praised the Mirage and innovation as the saviors of the air campaign.  Army 
Chief General V.P. Malik qualified the air effort as “not effective against enemy posts” 
but “innovating and … ever willing.”188  The IAF achieved remarkable successes, yet 
CAS strikes did not provide reliable and consistent firepower to ground forces.  The 
cumulative effect of the high altitude environment, a heightened SAM threat, and 
equipment and training deficiencies diminished the effectiveness of CAS as a source of 
responsive fire in support of ground maneuver. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Indian Armed Forces were caught off guard and unprepared for the Pakistani 
intrusion.  Initial operations revealed significant deficiencies in the ability to wage war at 
high altitude on short notice.  Units arrived on the battlefield without the benefit of 
acclimatization, and without the essential gear required to survive in the frigid 
environment.  Tactical errors added to these deficiencies, and resulted in assaults that 
stalled against a determined foe atop commanding heights.  Indian infantrymen went on 
the attack, typically frontal assaults, without adequate firepower provided by either 
artillery or air power.  Pakistani defenders, undeterred by the light volume of fire on their 
positions, stopped Indian attacks with heavy fire.  A rapid deployment that afforded little 
time for much needed preparation, as well as an underestimation of the enemy, led to 
poorly coordinated and unsuccessful attacks. 
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The Indian Army adapted to the environment and gained the initiative.  
Commanders, when time permitted, initiated condensed acclimatization and training 
programs.  Infantry battalions enveloped Pakistani positions, choosing the most difficult 
avenues of approach at night to gain surprise.  Assaults were slow and methodical, yet 
succeeded when supported by overwhelming firepower.  The Indian Army deployed 
tremendous amounts of artillery assets, and preceded each assault with an overwhelming 
barrage.  Artillery established itself as the weapon of choice in the high mountains. 
Several factors prevented the IAF from providing timely and reliable close 
support to ground maneuver.  Restrictions imposed following early aircraft losses added 
to the detrimental effects of the high altitude atmosphere.  CAS missions became 
hindrances to ground maneuver on several occasions, and delayed ground operations with 
inaccurate strikes.  The IAF adapted by targeting Pakistani supply lines and isolating their 
forward positions.  Mirage aircraft reduced NLI positions on Tiger Hill, destroying the 
enemy’s battalion headquarters.  The service contributed to the campaign, yet its ability 
to provide CAS in the high altitude environment proved to be a shortcoming. 
The Indian Army weathered early setbacks and achieved victory on the high 
altitude battlefield.  Massive artillery fire, combined with daring maneuver, overcame the 
challenge of defeating an enemy atop commanding heights.  Air power could not deliver 
consistent and reliable firepower to support ground maneuver.  Laser-guided munitions 
(LGM) improved accuracy, yet the heightened risk and atmospheric effects prevented the 
IAF from providing the volume of fire necessary to suppress Pakistani positions.  Would 
these conclusions be relevant in future high altitude warfare?  Could a technologically 
advanced U.S. military, with satellite-guided precision munitions and advanced weapons 
platforms superior to those of India, overcome the effects of the high altitude atmosphere 
and mountain terrain?  These questions would be answered three years later, when the 




U.S. experiences in combat in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002 parallel those 
of Indian forces at Kargil, despite the U.S. military’s significant advantage in weapons 
technology.  U.S. ground forces entered combat without the supporting fire of artillery, 
relying primarily on air power to provide the firepower necessary to support maneuver.  
An irregular enemy in dispersed positions, with the support of mortar and artillery fire, 
provided unexpectedly stiff resistance against U.S. forces.  Heavy attack helicopters 
proved vulnerable to ground fire and suffered from an inability to hover in thin air.  U.S. 
air power dropped a significant amount of ordnance on well-hidden al Qaeda positions 
protected by mountainous terrain.  Yet close air support, similar to the IAF’s experience 
at Kargil, could not provide the volume of fire necessary to support ground maneuver 
against a determined enemy.  Unlike the Indian Army at Kargil, U.S. infantry would not 
have the benefit of massed artillery fire. 
 
B. AFGHANISTAN 
In October 2001 the United States initiated offensive operations against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the al Qaeda terrorist network that it harbored.  An 
aerial bombardment campaign, in coordination with ground combat by Afghan forces 
augmented by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams, culminated in the defeat of 
the Taliban in early December.189  Large pockets of al Qaeda remained in the mountains 
of eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.  U.S. forces identified significant al 
Qaeda activity in the Shah-i-Kot valley, southeast of Gardez in the Paktia province, in the 
spring of 2002.  In March allied forces initiated a ground and air assault, Operation 
                                                 
189 U.S. air power in coordination with ground maneuver by the Northern Alliance, Afghan forces 
allied with the United States, defeated Taliban and al Qaeda forces in a series of battles in open terrain in 
November and December 2001.  Battles typically ended in breakthrough of Taliban defenses, such as Bai 
Beche in November, or mass surrender following a siege, such as the surrender of 5,000 Taliban fighters at 
Konduz in late November.  Al Qaeda remnants remained in the country after the Taliban leadership fled 
following the fall of Kandahar in December.  A sixteen-day battle in the White Mountains near Tora Bora 
ended inconclusively, with sizable al Qaeda elements fleeing across the border into Pakistan.  Stephen 
Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle 
Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 11. 
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Anaconda, against a large al Qaeda group located in the Shah-I-Kot valley, the highest 
battlefield in U.S. history. 
Eastern Afghanistan and Ladakh share several similar characteristics, with one 
notable exception.  The mountains that encircle the Shah-i-Kot valley reach 12,500 feet 
(3,800 m), some 4,200 feet (1,280 m) less than the elevation of Tiger Hill and most 
battles at Kargil.  Despite the difference in altitude, the atmosphere at 12,500 feet (3,800 
m) exhibits similar qualities as the rarified air above the LOC in Kashmir.  Barometric 
pressure at 12,500 feet (3,800 m) is approximately two-thirds of its value at sea level.190  
Temperatures in eastern Afghanistan in early March 2002 dropped to -10° C at night, and 
snow fell as U.S. forces initiated the battle.  The barren and rocky landscape resembles 
that of Ladakh as well. 
 
1. Ground Combat in the Shah-i-Kot Valley 
In early March, a U.S. infantry force of approximately 1,200 men, supported by a 
like number of Afghan allies and significant U.S. air power, launched Operation 
Anaconda against an al Qaeda force estimated at 1,000 fighters (see Figure 7).  The plan 
called for an Afghan and SOF attack from Gardez into the western portion of the valley; 
commanders hoped that the assault would force the enemy to flee to the east into 
blocking positions established by U.S. infantry forces on the eastern edge of the 
valley.191  Al Qaeda forces offered stiff resistance, and instead of fleeing to the east, held 
their ground and repelled the allied Afghan assault, forcing the column to withdraw back 
to Gardez.  U.S. soldiers who flew into their blocking positions by helicopter expected 
light resistance, but instead received heavy fire from machine guns, mortars, and 
howitzers on the landing zones (LZ).  A seventeen-day battle ensued, in which eight U.S. 
                                                 
190 Barometric pressure is approximately 500 mmHG at 12,500 feet (3,800 m), compared to 760 
mmHG at sea level.  Medical Problems in High Mountain Environments, 5. 
191 Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 10th Mountain Division formed the 
majority of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain.  An overview of the operation, as well as a 
detailed account of the events on Takur Ghar Mountain, can be found in Executive Summary of the Battle of 
Takur Ghar, U.S. Department of Defense (24 May 2002) at  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020524takurghar.pdf > (May 2003). 
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soldiers were killed and seventy-six wounded in action; up to half of the al Qaeda forces 
on the field may have been killed as well.192 
 
Figure 7.   Operation Anaconda. (From: 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0314/p06s01-wosc.html> (May 2003)) 
 
U.S. forces underestimated the enemy, repeating the Indian Army’s 
miscalculations in the initial stages of Operation Vijay.  Soldiers flew into the valley at 
dawn, instead of under the cover of darkness, because commanders assumed that the 
threat posed by flying in the mountains at night was greater than the risk of enemy fire.  
Senior U.S. officers expected a seventy-two hour battle against light resistance, and 
“didn’t want to go in with a whole lot of firepower.”193  As a result, many U.S. infantry 
companies went into battle without their most responsive fire support assets, mortars.194  
                                                 
192 Some officials estimate that up to 450 al Qaeda fighters were killed in action during Operation 
Anaconda, but exact casualty figures are not known.  Gerry J. Gilmore, “Anaconda Is Success; Enemy 
Killed Unknown, Say Officials,” Armed Forces Press Service News Articles (15 March 2002) at 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/n03152002_200203154.htm> (May 2003).  
193 Quote from U.S. Army Major Dennis Yates, fire support officer for the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne 
Division. Elaine M. Grossman, “Left in the Dark for Most Anaconda Planning, Air Force Opens New 
Probe,” Inside the Pentagon (3 October 2002) at <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/e20021003left.htm> 
(October 2002). 
194 Of the 34 mortars available to 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 26 were employed in direct 
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The infantry battalions also entered combat without their 105-mm artillery batteries.  
Senior commanders believed that the difficulty in airlifting and transporting artillery 
pieces in rugged terrain and thin air exceeded the potential benefit.195  
Al Qaeda mortar and howitzer fire caused the majority of casualties in the first 
two days of Operation Anaconda.196  U.S. forces would eventually destroy five D-30 
howitzers that fired on helicopter landing zones.197  Mortars provided the only immediate 
form of suppression for U.S. forces without artillery support.  Artillery had proven to be 
an indispensable source of firepower in the mountains of Kargil, setting the stage for 
successful maneuver with relentless bombardment of Pakistani positions.  U.S. forces 
under fire in the Shah-i-Kot valley had no comparable element to call on for fire support.  
They would instead turn to close air support (CAS) provided by fixed wing aircraft and 
attack helicopters. 
 
2. The Apache in the Mountains 
U.S. helicopters suffered from environmental limitations similar to those faced by 
Indian aircraft at Kargil.  Just as Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) helicopters 
provided invaluable transport capability to the Indian Army, the CH-47D Chinook proved 
to be a crucial source of mobility and heavy lift for U.S. forces in the mountains of 
Afghanistan.198  Unlike Indian forces at Kargil, the U.S. military would be able to 
employ its heavy attack helicopter, the AH-64A Apache.  Altitudes approaching 18,000 
                                                 
support of operations in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, with the other systems remaining at Bagram and Kandahar.  
Christopher F. Bentley, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in 
Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery (September-October 2002), 13. 
195 According to Major General (MG) Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Commanding General (CG) of the 10th 
Mountain Division and Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain, if he “had 105s, because of the terrain 
and lack of road system, [he] would not have brought them in on the first day.”  Robert H. McElroy, 
“Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery (September-October 2002), 6. 
196 Enemy indirect fire caused 28 of 36 casualties in the first two days of operations.  Eric Shinseki, 
General, U.S. Army, “Hearing on the Cancellation of the Crusader Program,” testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 16 May 2002. 
197 The D-30 is a 122-mm towed howitzer with a maximum range of fifteen-kilometers.  Robert H. 
McElroy, “Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” 9. 
198 The single-engine UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter was not used to transport troops because of 
limitations on lift capability.  U.S. forces relied on the twin-engine CH-47D Chinook for transport, which 
could carry 15,000-pounds at 9,000 feet (2,750 m).  Frank Colucci, “Helicopters for a Long War,” Vertiflite 
Vol. 48, No. 4 (Fall 2002), 23.  
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feet (5,485 m) at Kargil had prevented the IAF from using the Mi-25 attack helicopter, 
forcing Indian forces to rely on the lighter Mi-17.   
Seven AH-64A Apache attack helicopters escorted the CH-47D Chinooks that 
ferried soldiers and supplies to the landing zones (LZ), and remained on station to 
provide CAS for the infantry.  The Apaches had difficulty hovering in the rarified air, and 
had to rely on “running gunfire” to engage targets, similar to the Mi-17s employed by the 
Indian Army in an attack role.  The Apache has a distinct advantage over the Mi-17, 
however, in that the AH-64A possesses an infrared jamming device that defeats SAMs 
such as the Stinger.199  At Kargil the Indian Mi-17s had no such device, making them 
vulnerable to NLI SAMs.  But mountainous terrain made the superior Apache equally 
vulnerable to enemy fire.  Al Qaeda positions were well hidden in irregular terrain, 
similar to the NLI positions at Kargil, forcing the helicopters to fly as close as 200 meters 
to enemy positions to identify and engage them with fire.200  Most al Qaeda fire against 
U.S. helicopters consisted of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and machine guns, for 
which there is no countermeasure.201 
Heavy fire and environmental limitations hampered the Apache’s ability to 
provide CAS.  As one pilot put it, “if you hover, you will die, so move and shoot.”202  
Yet the pilots of the 101st Aviation Regiment had not routinely trained for “running 
gunfire” missions, making much of their fire inaccurate.203  Mountainous terrain further 
limited the Apaches’ effectiveness, disrupting line of sight radio communications and 
making coordination with other aircraft and ground forces difficult.  Five of the seven 
Apaches were eventually disabled by enemy ground fire and forced to withdraw.  Four 
U.S. Marine AH-1W SuperCobra attack helicopters augmented the force, and performed 
                                                 
199 The AH-64A is equipped with the AN/ALQ-144 infrared jamming device.  Michael Puttre, 
“How’d They Do?,” Journal of Electronic Defense Vol. 25, No. 9 (September 2002), 44. 
200 Dodge Billingsley, “Choppers in the Coils,” Journal of Electronic Defense Vol. 25, No. 9 
(September 2002), 38. 
201 Al Qaeda RPGs brought down two U.S. MH-47E Special Operations Chinook helicopters during 
Operation Anaconda.  Frank Colucci, “Helicopters for a Long War,” 19. 
202 Quote from Chief Warrant Officer Rich Chenault, an Apache pilot assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 
101st Aviation Regiment.  Dodge Billingsley, “Choppers in the Coils.” 
203 Michael Puttre, “How’d They Do?,” 44. 
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well, ultimately completing 217 sorties in close support of ground forces.204  Yet with the 
Apaches out of the fight, the four SuperCobras could not respond to all of the requests for 
supporting fire, and U.S. ground forces would rely on fixed wing aircraft.  
 
3. Air Power and Precision in Operation Anaconda 
The demand for firepower increased as ground combat intensified.  Artillery did 
not exist in the theater of operations.  Many units had flown into combat without their 
mortars.  Apache pilots had performed courageously, but their aircraft had been knocked 
out of the fight by heavy enemy fire.  A wide range of United States Air Force (USAF) 
and Navy aircraft responded, and ultimately dropped more than six million pounds of 
ordnance onto the Shah-i-Kot valley.205  Most of these aircraft employed the Joint Direct 
Attack Munition (JDAM). 
The JDAM is a guidance tail kit that converts unguided free-fall bombs into all-
weather precision-guided munitions (PGM).  A Global Positioning System (GPS) 
guidance control unit and inertial navigation system (INS) in the tail section allows the 
JDAM to navigate to its target after release.  It therefore offers a significant advantage 
over laser-guided munitions (LGM), because clouds, dust and smoke do not affect the 
JDAM’s trajectory as it flies toward the GPS coordinates entered by the aircrew.206  It is 
most effective against fixed targets, not a mobile enemy, such as al Qaeda mortar teams 
that can quickly displace and use terrain for protection.  All-weather characteristics 
appear to make the JDAM an ideal weapon for the high altitude environment, where 
unpredictable changes in precipitation and cloud cover are the norm. 
Despite the significant technological advantage afforded by the JDAM, the U.S. 
air effort encountered many of the same challenges as Indian Air Force (IAF) operations 
at Kargil.  U.S. aircraft faced an enemy in small, mobile teams dispersed in uneven 
                                                 
204 Frank Colucci, “Helicopters for a Long War,” 22. 
205 USAF F-15E, F-16, B-52 and B-1 aircraft, as well as U.S. Navy F-14 and F-18 aircraft, 
participated in Operation Anaconda.  Elaine M. Grossman, “Left in the Dark for Most Anaconda Planning, 
Air Force Opens New Probe.” 
206 The JDAM is slightly less accurate than the LGM, with a circular error probable (CEP) of thirteen 
meters, compared to ten meters for most LGMs.  Another distinct advantage of the JDAM is that it does not 
require the aircraft to loiter and maintain the sight picture while the munition flies to the target, which is 
necessary for the LGM.  Glenn W. Goodman Jr., “Terminal Accuracy.” 
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terrain.  U.S. planners believed that the al Qaeda possessed a significant number of 
portable SAMs that could be easily hidden in terrain folds.207  Most U.S. aircraft flew at 
altitudes above 20,000 feet (6,100 m) to avoid the SAM threat, making target acquisition 
difficult.208  Pilots were also constrained by a small view of target areas from the cockpit, 
referred to as “about the size of a postage stamp,” and an angle of attack that made target 
acquisition difficult.209  
Immediately following the battle, U.S. Army participants credited CAS with 
destroying most al Qaeda mortars and howitzers in the first two days of combat.210  
However, closer inspection revealed that many al Qaeda positions survived extensive air 
strikes.  U.S. aircraft failed to destroy the al Qaeda positions atop Objective Ginger, a 
mountain at 10,200 feet (3,100 m), despite ten days of continuous bombing.  U.S. ground 
forces eventually discovered an enemy position surrounded by five JDAM craters whose 
occupants had survived the aerial bombardment.211  Most enemy forces hid in deep caves 
during air strikes, and reemerged after the bombing run to continue the fight.212  U.S. 
participants also identified limiting effects of terrain on aerial munitions that are similar 
to those observed by Indian forces at Kargil: 
The hills were just really steep, and really rocky … if a 
bomb was a couple of hundred yards off the target on the 
horizontal, with the vertical interval there going up a 





                                                 
207 U.S. planners believed that the al Qaeda possessed significant numbers of Russian-made SA-7s, 
which are low-altitude, man-portable SAMs.  Robert H. McElroy, “Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation 
Anaconda,” 8. 
208 Elaine M. Grossman, “Left in the Dark for Most Anaconda Planning, Air Force Opens New 
Probe.” 
209 Robert H. McElroy, “Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” 8. 
210 Rebecca Grant, “The Clash About CAS,” Air Force Magazine Vol. 86, No. 1 (January 2003), 58. 
211 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense 
Policy, 35. 
212 Dodge Billingsley, “Choppers in the Coils,” 40. 
213 Observation made by Major Dennis Yates.  Elaine M. Grossman, “Left in the Dark for Most 
Anaconda Planning, Air Force Opens New Probe.” 
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C. FINDINGS 
Combat in the mountains of Kargil and Afghanistan demonstrates that the nature 
of warfare at high altitude has not significantly changed, even with the emergence of 
precision munitions.  Mountain warfare is the domain of light infantry.  Artillery remains 
a necessary element of maneuver warfare.  Air power alone cannot deliver sufficient 
firepower to support ground maneuver in the high mountains.  The suppressive fire 
afforded by artillery is more valuable than the precision of aerial munitions on the high 
altitude battlefield.  Advanced precision munitions, such as the JDAM, are effective 
against unprotected fixed targets in any environment.  But in a fluid battle in the rugged 
terrain of the high mountains, the firepower necessary to support methodical and difficult 
ground maneuver cannot be provided by close air support alone. 
The surge of air assets to critical areas, such as an intense SOF firefight atop 
Takur Ghar Mountain during Operation Anaconda, can sometimes overcome the 
limitations of CAS at high altitude.  A similar event occurred during the battle for Tiger 
Hill at Kargil, when Mirage aircraft conducted a series of successful strikes against NLI 
positions.  Yet such occurrences are not the rule, and factors such as the weather, 
increased ground threat, and survivability of enemy positions in irregular terrain combine 
to make CAS less than sufficient to act as the lone supporter of ground assault.214  The 
Indian Army relied heavily on massed artillery fire as the campaign at Kargil wore on.  
The U.S. Army did not have artillery in Afghanistan in March 2002; if it had, there is 
little doubt that it would have been the weapon of choice in the Shah-i-Kot valley. 
In addition to overwhelming firepower, high altitude combat requires extensive 
preparation.  Rehearsals and acclimatization, two essential elements of success on the 
high altitude battlefield, require time.  A short-notice war that demands rapid deployment 
to high altitude is a difficult and risky endeavor.  1 Naga and 8 Sikh entered combat 
operations on Tiger Hill without the benefit of time to prepare for the rigors of high 
                                                 
214 One factor that affects the responsiveness of CAS, although not addressed here because it is 
unrelated to the environment, is the time required to request and arm PGMs.  MG Hagenbeck observed that 
it generally required at least 26 minutes from request to weapons release, due to several factors, such as the 
lack of USAF Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETAC) in ground units and the lengthy calculation of 
the Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) required to ensure PGM accuracy.  USAF personnel counter that 
thorough planning for the use of CAS on the part of the ground force, which did not occur prior to 
Operation Anaconda, could have lessened the response time. Rebecca Grant, “The Clash About CAS,” 57. 
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altitude, and launched poorly planned and costly assaults.  2 RAJ RIF, given time for 
extensive rehearsals and an acclimatization program, seized Tololing and created a 
turning point in the conflict.   
Only highly trained, physically fit soldiers can perform the demanding maneuver 
required to achieve victory in the mountains.  A team of U.S. Army Rangers in the midst 
of the most intense firefight of Operation Anaconda conducted a 1,000-foot (300 m) 
climb on the snow-covered Takur Ghar Mountain without ropes.  Most of the men 
climbed on all fours, carrying up to eighty pounds of gear.215  Basic mountaineering skill 
is a necessity for all soldiers.  Advanced mountaineers are force multipliers that 
dramatically alter the commander’s maneuver options.  Rope teams consisting of Indian 
High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) instructors and Ladakh scouts performed 
remarkable feats in the Indian Army’s most celebrated victories at Kargil.   
Daring maneuver by light infantry forces is a necessary component of combat as 
well.  Tactical surprise, which is essential against an enemy that holds the high ground, is 
typically achieved by night assault along an unexpected approach.  But the infantry 
cannot assault the heights without concentrated supporting fire.  Ground maneuver in 
restrictive terrain against an enemy in protected positions relies heavily on the application 
of firepower.  Aircraft, vulnerable to a heightened ground threat, cannot provide the 
reliable and relentless fire needed to suppress a determined enemy.  Only artillery can 
provide concentrated fire, which although imprecise, provides the necessary cover for 
ground assault. 
Underestimation of the enemy, and the tactical mistakes that follow, is difficult to 
overcome in unforgiving mountain terrain.  The inability to adapt to the high altitude 
environment leads to failure as well.  Forces can use the imposing terrain of the high 
altitude battlefield to their advantage.  Mountain terrain and the high altitude atmosphere 
can afford protection or diminish an asymmetrical advantage, restricting the use of 
advanced weapons platforms like the attack helicopter.  The NLI held the initial 
advantage with concealed positions spread across dominating peaks.  Yet limited tactical 
flexibility and the detrimental effects of the environment granted the Indian Army an 
                                                 
215 Bradley Graham, “Ambush at Takur Ghar: Fighting for Survival in the Afghan Snow,” The 
Washington Post (25 May 2002) at <http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2002/s20020528wintry.htm> (May 2002). 
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opportunity to regain the initiative.  Tactical innovation, as well as the application of 




A ground force destined for combat in the high mountains must be tailored to 
meet the demands of the environment.  Logistic support is necessarily difficult and 
requires more assets than in other less strenuous environments.  The force requirement 
increases accordingly, to both secure and man supply lines and other essential assets, 
such as artillery batteries.  The plight of isolated NLI soldiers at Kargil demonstrates the 
fate that befalls the force that is not fully supported at high altitude.  Similarly, decisive 
maneuver in the mountains requires a significant infantry force capable of operating in 
small units.  The force must be unencumbered by heavy loads, and capable of traversing 
the world’s most inaccessible terrain. 
The full range of firepower, delivered from the air, sea and ground, is necessary to 
provide overwhelming lethality to the force engaged in combat at high altitude.  Aerial 
munitions are part of the full spectrum of echeloned firepower that should be available to 
ground forces.  Fixed wing aircraft can fulfill an array of roles in combat at high altitude 
ranging from the destruction of fixed targets to the delivery of emergency close air 
support.  Attack helicopters can provide responsive firepower if pilots are trained to fly in 
thin air and employ “running gunfire” techniques.  Yet air power cannot be relied upon as 
the sole provider of the responsive, concentrated fire needed to support ground maneuver.  
Suppressive fire, created by a heavy volume of continuous fire over a wide area, is a 
necessary complement to ground maneuver, and is best provided by artillery. 
Artillery must be available to forces engaged in ground combat, despite the 
challenges posed by the high mountains.  The Indian Army at Kargil demonstrated the 
overwhelming lethality of artillery.  All weather, responsive fire is essential to maneuver 
warfare on any battlefield, including the high mountains.  British and U.S. forces that 
deployed to Afghanistan after Operation Anaconda brought 105-mm artillery batteries.  
They successfully transported the artillery pieces by air throughout the country, proving 
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that they could have been employed during Operation Anaconda if they had been 
available.216   
 
E. FINAL WORDS 
Revolutions in technology drive tactical change.  Yet certain regions of the world 
remain largely unaffected by the full reach of advances in military technology.  Thin air, 
cold weather, and mountainous terrain combine to create a uniquely inhospitable 
battlefield at high altitude.  The elements of military victory at high altitude have not 
dramatically changed.  Overwhelming fire, in concert with bold maneuver, continues to 
determine victory on the high altitude battlefield.  The emergence of precision warfare 






















                                                 












































APPENDIX. ARRAY OF FORCES DURING THE KARGIL 
CONFLICT 
This appendix contains maps of NLI incursions in the Mushkoh Valley, Dras and 
Kaksar sector; Batalik sector; and the Chorbat La and Turtok sector.  The dashed line 
represents the front line of Pakistani advance across the LOC.  Indian Army deployments 
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